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The enactment of the 1998 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Reform Act resulted 
directly from perceived lapses in the federal taxation administration, which was publicly 
highlighted in Congressional hearings.  Congress reacted by fundamentally altering the 
IRS’s implementation of the Internal Revenue Code (for the first time since 1952).  The 
Joint Committee on Taxation noted that the overall objective of the 1998 IRS Reform Act 
was to have “a well-run IRS [which] is critical to the operation of our tax system.” 
From a public administration paradigm, the IRS moved from a traditional tax 
management methodology to a New Public Management (NPM) methodology.  
Traditional tax management focused on efficiency and effectiveness typically measured 
by tax collections per dollar spent.  NPM focuses on “performance based” activities 
emphasizing the responsiveness to the needs of taxpayers.  Ultimately, the IRS’s core 
function remains the annual collection of nearly $2 trillion in taxes.   
The effects of the 1998 IRS Reform Act on the IRS’s administration were 
assessed within the context of this paradigm shift in management.   Partial replication of 
the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey showed taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have 
not improved.  In fact, the IRS’s receipt of top quality service evaluations universally 
decreased.  Analysis of selected enforcement/compliance data showed that the number of 
IRS auditors is inversely related to the annual tax gap.  The data of this dissertation, 
however, indicated that the 1998 IRS Reform Act resulted in better taxpayer compliance.  
Examination of the IRS’s personnel data shows that IRS executives have not received 
private pay parity, and the IRS strategically misrepresented §1203 employee termination 
violations in 2003. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998 (hereafter, the 1998 IRS Reform Act) transpired as a direct result of perceived 
lapses in the administration of federal taxation.  Major failures in almost all areas of tax 
administration and enforcement posture were publicly highlighted in Congressional 
hearings leading up to the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  At the time, the IRS was publicly 
portrayed as no less than “evil”1 in televised Congressional hearings.  Congress 
subsequently passed the 1998 IRS Reform Act with overwhelming majorities of 402-8 in 
the House and 96-2 in the Senate.  Significantly, the last major reform of IRS 
administration occurred 46 years earlier in 1952. 
The objective of the ensuing legislation was to improve the overall tax 
administration with an emphasis on taxpayer responsiveness.  To achieve this legislative 
mandate for reform, Congress required the IRS to change its mission statement.  The 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) observed that the IRS subsequently established three 
strategic goals of providing “top quality service to each taxpayer,” providing “top quality 
service to all taxpayers” (enforcement), and “providing IRS employees with a quality 
work environment” to facilitate the required changes (JCT 2003, 1). 
The objective of this research project is to examine U.S. tax administration before 
and after the 1998 IRS Reform Act within the theory of New Public Management (NPM).  
This theory is modeled under a governmental system that was mandated to shift from a 
rigid bureaucratic structure to a more responsive system.  The 1998 IRS Reform                   
Act resulted in the IRS shifting existing resources to customer services from 
                                                 
1 Former IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander (1973 to 1977), National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 
35). 
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enforcement.  An examination of this legislation from a tax policy perspective generates 
the following central research questions:  
What were the actual effects of the “landmark” 1998 IRS Reform Act?  Has the 
Act resulted in an overall positive, negative, or no change in U.S. tax 
administration from both a public perception and an internal taxation 
administration perspectives? 
 
As the JCT (1998, 1) observed, “a well-run IRS is critical to the operation of our tax 
system.”  The degree of progress or deterioration since the 1998 IRS Reform Act can be 
assessed empirically.  An evaluation of these changes can assess whether the IRS is 
moving towards, away from, or is unchanged in achieving the overall aim of “a well-run 
IRS.” 
Three main sets of hypotheses focus on pre- and post- enactment on the changes 
to the: 
 Public’s perception of the IRS (1990 compared to 2004) 
 
 IRS’s enforcement posture (1981-2003) 
 
 IRS’s personnel environment (1998-2003)  
  
In 1990, the IRS commissioned a comprehensive nationwide survey of taxpayers 
to obtain their overall perception of its administration of the U.S. tax system.  NPM-
related questions from this survey were re-asked to taxpayers to determine any potential 
changes in response patterns.  Enforcement data that centers on the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis - Adjusted Gross Income Gap (BEA-AGIG) was analyzed for any potential 
effects on taxpayers’ compliance.  Internal IRS personnel data reported in mandated 
annual Congressional Reports on the effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was examined to 
assess the potential changes in the IRS’s work environment.   
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These sets of diverse information sources were utilized to proxy for the IRS’s 
administration and enforcement postures to determine whether a transformation in the 
quality of tax administration, either constructive or unconstructive, has occurred since 
1998 (allowing for a triangulation of data sources and measurements). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 14) asked, “Why is accounting and auditing 
practice like it is?”  This dissertation in a broad sense asks, “Why is taxation 
administration like it is?”  The objective is to “explain and predict the phenomena” of a 
tax system’s movement from a traditional management approach towards an NPM 
approach (i.e., test of NPM).  U.S. tax administration was comprehensively examined 
through the lens of a tax policy framework. 
1.1 1998 IRS Reform Act 
On July 22, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  
This Act marked the end product of a three-year effort to Congressionally overhaul the 
administration of the IRS.  Momentum for the Act occurred during Congressional tax 
hearings, and new significant provisions for taxpayers were a direct result of these 
proceedings.  Hevrdejs (1998, 1) noted that the “fundamental tenets of tax law 
procedure” were altered in the areas of: 
 “Shifting the burden of proof” 
 
 “Extending attorney-client provision to accountants and enrolled agents” 
 
 “More liberal compromise procedures”  
 
 “Interest, penalties and innocent spouse relief”  
 
Hevrdejs observed that the battlefield between taxpayers and the IRS on the most basic 
level was altered, and the “IRS is likely to be an organization in transition for some 
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time.”  See Appendix I for a listing of major provisions contained in the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act.2   
Former Democratic Senator J. Robert Kerrey and Republican Representative Rob 
Portman initiated this semi-bipartisan legislation.  Relative to his view that the IRS was 
unfair to taxpayers, Senator Kerrey stated, “We have changed the law to change that 
perception” (Donmoyer 1998).  The Act was historical, as the IRS (2000, 1) observed: 
The Internal Revenue Service was established in its current form in 1952, in the 
wake of corruption scandals and a Presidential Commission. The objective was 
to create an agency that would collect federal taxes according to the law without 
political or corrupt influence. The IRS mission statement, written in the 1960s 
and in effect until 1998, reflected the way the agency saw itself and was seen by 
the public. Its operative words were “collect the proper amount of tax.” 
 
The fundamental reform effort underlying the 1998 IRS Reform Act is reflected 
in the requirement that the long-standing mission statement of the agency be abandoned.  
Congress specifically called upon the IRS to change its mission statement in §1002 to 
emphasize the importance of serving taxpayers.  The IRS subsequently eliminated any 
mention of collections in its revised statement and importantly called for “top quality 
service.”  The new IRS Mission Statement reads (IRS 2000, 1): 
Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and 
meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and 
fairness to all.  
 
In stark contrast, the prior IRS mission statement focused on “collecting the proper 
amount of tax” and read as follows (JCT 1998, 16):  
 
                                                 
2 This Act was massive in scale and covered provisions other than those directly related to reform.  This 
dissertation focuses on Title I through Title IV of the 1998 IRS Reform Act that the IRS addressed with its 
three stated goals (taxpayer service, enforcement, and IRS work environment).                
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The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of 
tax revenue at the least cost; serve the public by continually improving the 
quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner warranting the 
highest degree of public confidence in our integrity and fairness.  
 
The dynamics of the 1997 and 1998 Congressional tax hearings that led to the 
1998 Tax Reform Act (which mandated fundamental changes in the collection activities 
of the IRS) resulted in the IRS reacting in a predictable fashion.  As Bergin and Brown 
(2003) observed, the “message” to the IRS was to “back off enforcement” and 
“enforcement statistics” clearly show that the IRS got the message.  They observed that 
the new IRS mission statement does not even mention the core IRS function of collecting 
taxes. 
The political process inherent in taxation results in the convergence of competing 
interests in a dramatic fashion.  This competition for favorable tax treatment is a time-
honored fabric of the political reality.  The 1998 Tax Reform Act resulted from anti-IRS 
sentiments/forces coming together, and this Act fundamentally affected the IRS’s 
collection enforcement posture.  However, from an economic standpoint, “the reliable 
tenacity of the tax collector” is often assumed.  The question thus becomes, “is this 
assumption valid, given the current state of the tax system?”  Additionally, how have the 
changes mandated in the 1998 IRS Reform Act affected taxpayer service and IRS 
personnel? 
1.2 Symposium of IRS Commissioners 
The National Tax Journal in May 1998 held a tax symposium on the then 
upcoming tax legislation.  A panel of four former IRS Commissioners was convened to 
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discuss different aspects of the existing legislative environment.3  Questions centered on 
the possible deficiency in the then current legislative proposals, the potential influence on 
enforcement/compliance, the prior data collection methods of the IRS,4 the effect on IRS 
employees, and the overall role of the IRS (among other issues). 
Relative to the alleged IRS orientation “that the IRS culture views taxpayers as 
the enemy,” former IRS Commissioner Goldberg replied (National Tax Journal 
Symposium 1998, 425):  
To a great extent we have a system that does view the taxpayer as the enemy.  I 
believe that perspective is more all-pervasive than we want to acknowledge in 
public conversation.  I believe that perspective is not a function of the 
workforce; I believe it is a function of the message the workforce has been 
given. 
 
Former Commissioner Alexander observed that the IRS was “demonized” mainly for 
political expediency. 
Ex-commissioner Richardson asked whether it was “the system created by 
Congress or the system created by the IRS.”  The IRS mission was noted to be highly 
complex, and she argued that “the regime has gotten out of control.”  Former 
Commissioner Goldberg stated, “They’re being asked to administer a tax system that is 
largely incomprehensible.”  The Commissioners observed within this environment that it 
                                                 
3 Former IRS Commissioners Donald C. Alexander (1973 to 1977), Fred T. Goldberg (1989 to 1992) and 
Margaret M. Richardson (1993-1997) were discussants.  Former Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs (1986 
to 1989) submitted written comments. 
4 Specifically mentioned were the interrelated Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) and 
Discriminant Information Function (DIF). The TCMP was a line-by-line audit utilized by the IRS to 
compile compliance data. The TCMP was last conducted in 1988.  The DIF assigns a numerical weight to a 
tax return, the higher the DIF score the greater probability of an audit [under §6103(b)(2) the score is 
specifically protected from public disclosure].  The panelists noted one effective product of the TCMP was 
a change that required the reporting of Social Security numbers for dependents in 1986.  A year after 
institution approximately 7 million out of 77 million dependents disappeared from the U.S. tax system.  In 
2002, the National Research Program (NRP) was initiated, with some claiming it is a resurrection of 
TCMP. The first stage of the NRP is currently under way (Bonacum and Allen 2002, and Alexander 2003). 
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was amazing the system functioned “as well as it did.”  Former Commissioner 
Richardson stated (National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 434): 
One my biggest disappointments about the hearings in the fall and again this 
spring is that there really has been no balance and no sense of perspective, and 
no effort to bring it to bear or very little effort, I should say. 
 
Former Commissioner Goldberg noted, “The hearings were political theater” and the 
corresponding process was politicized “to show how really evil [the] IRS is and how it 
preys on people and destroys their rights and their liberties.” 
Former Commissioner Richardson observed that the heightened political nature of 
the taxation process at the time was affecting the orientation of the tax legislation.  She 
observed it was “the political system, not just the tax system” that was demanding 
changes. 
  The future effect of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) on enforcement was 
identified as an area of concern.  Former Commissioner Alexander predicted that the 
“grey area” between tax avoidance and evasion would be expanded with more taxpayers 
willing to take more aggressive positions.  He also expressed concern about preserving a 
sufficient amount of tax compliance, and openly asked if this situation was “a race to the 
bottom.”  Former Commissioner Alexander noted that “still [the] IRS needs to have a 
strong, effective, and responsible compliance component to make the system work.”  
Relative to shifting the burden of proof to the IRS, former Commissioner Goldberg noted 
(National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 419):  
I think the problem with it is that it can provide certain incentives to the IRS that 
are going to cause the agency to act in a manner very different from the way I 
think Congress is expecting.   
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This potential for unintended consequences was an area of concern. Former 
Commissioner Richardson observed the continual conflict that the IRS faces in 
administering tax laws.  She reflected on Congressional demands that were polar 
opposites.  She stated (National Tax Journal Symposium 1998, 416): 
I testified one week before a committee that was very concerned about why the 
IRS was not collecting every last dollar and, at least two members told me they 
wanted-they expected-every last dollar that was owed to be collected.  And the 
next week, I appeared before a different committee in which a number of 
members, and particularly one I’ll never forget, expressed the view: “what’s a 
couple of billion dollars worth of fraud?  You should be much less concerned 
about collecting money and more concerned about providing better taxpayer 
service.”  Clearly, a very schizophrenic approach to what we should be doing. 
 
The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandated that the IRS fundamentally adjust its mode 
of operations.  The overall effect of these changes (either positive, negative, or neither) 
can be modeled within the context of a tax system changing to NPM methodology.  The 
effects of 1998 IRS Reform Act are thus empirical questions. 
1.3 Reallocation of IRS Resources   
The IRS’s mode of operations was fundamentally changed as a result of the 1998 
IRS Reform Act.  In 1997, the IRS audited a total of 1.7 million individual and corporate 
returns, and in 2002, the total dropped over 50 percent to 827,000 (an even more dramatic 
decline occurred if one looks at 2000 compared to 1997).  In other words, the 




















1997 1,728,122 16,657 101,703 
1998 1,362,643 15,760 98,036 
1999 1,228,406 14,991 98,729 
2000 715,915 14,252 97,074 
2001 815,057 13,018 97,707 
2002 826,979 12,388 99,901 
This table reflects a year by year analysis of the number of IRS audits and IRS personnel 
staffing.  While total full time employees have remained relatively constant, the number of 
audits and the number of full time auditors have declined materially since 1997.  The source of 
this data was the JCT’s 2003 (7, 39 and 43) data request. 
 
Congressional supervision, IRS’s internal management, electronic filing, and taxpayers’ 
rights were all legislatively affected.   
Tax administration within the U.S. is a massive undertaking.  The sheer scope and 
size of IRS operations is reflected in Table 2. 
Table 2 





Total returns 175 
Individual returns 132 (75%) 
Individual refunds 104 
Direct Deposit of refund 30 
Simultaneous e-filing of federal & state returns  18 
Taxpayers who utilized automated telephone service 27 
Taxpayers who utilized walk-in assistance 4.53 
This table shows the enormity of IRS operations. The source of this data is the JCT (2003, 5 and 
6) data request.  
 
The JCT’s 2000 Annual Review observed that “face-to-face audits” were down 
40 percent since 1998.  It observed that “the IRS attributes this decline to continued 
decline in staff due to budget constraints and a substantial increase in the amount of time 
required per case due to provisions in the IRS Reform Act” (JCT 2000, 9).  From 1998 to 
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2002, average time spent on an individual return audit increased from 22 hours to 28.4; 
for larger corporations, the time increased from 140 hours to 232 hours.  Combined, these 
measures indicate decreasing enforcement coupled with growing complexity (JCT 2003, 
106). 
The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandates that the IRS fundamentally adjust its mode 
of operation.  It is hypothesized that the IRS’s reaction was to back off the resources 
devoted to compliance activities.  Those resources were diverted to taxpayer services and 
to overall yearly tax management (advance payments in the 2002 and 2003 Tax Acts).  
Table 3 highlights the decrease in direct audit staff between 1997 and 2000. 
Table 3 
Audit Technical Staff 
 Audit Technical Staff 1997 2002 % Decline 
Revenue agents 13,647 11,176 18% 
Tax compliance officers 2,113 1,212 43% 
This table focuses on the decline of key IRS audit personnel since the 1998 IRS Reform Act. 
The source of this data is the JCT (2003, 7) data request 
 
A confounding factor is that from 1998 to 2003, Congress has passed nearly 300 code 
provisions.  These constant changes have necessitated over 400 modifications to forms 
and instructions.  The current system of taxation has resulted in 127 various individual 
tax forms (JCT 2003, 6 and 8).   
The JCT noted that former IRS Commissioner Rossotti observed the declines in 
the following basic enforcement activities from 1992 to 2001 (JCT 2003, 5 direct quotes): 
1. Document matching decreased from 33.1 percent of cases to 9.1 
percent; 
 
2. Correspondence exams (not including the earned income credit) 
decreased from 4 to 1.2 percent; 
 
3. In-person exams of individuals fell from 5.8 percent to 1.5 percent; 
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4. Exams of pass-through entities decreased from 5.1 percent to 2.9 
percent. 
 
Indicative of these trends is the fact that currently 60 percent of all identified tax 
deficiencies are not pursued.  Nearly 80 percent of non-filers, abusive shelters, and 
matches of “under-reporters” are not pursued (JCT 2003, 35). 
Audit rate percentages have declined in nearly all major areas of audit 
enforcement.  In 1992, individual returns were audited .92 percent of the time compared 
to .57 percent in 2002.   Large corporate audit closures fell from 12,972 in 1992 to 8,443 
in 2002 (an over 30 percent decline).  The JCT (2003, 10) observed that a major 
contributor to this decrease was the erosion in assigned enforcement personnel that was 
“attributed to an increased workload and unbudgeted costs.” 
In July 2003, the IRS once again announced the delay of the implementation of its 
massive computer upgrade; in 1995, the IRS essentially abandoned a previous $4 billion 
attempt (Dooren and McWilliams 2003).  This situation has been an area of chronic GAO 
audit concern.  The IRS’s main taxpayer records are still based on tape-driven technology 
from the 1960s and 1970s.  The JCT in 2003 stated (JCT 2003, 55): 
One significant example, the Customer Account Data Engine will transfer 
individual filers from the 1960’s magnetic tape-based system for recording 
taxpayer information to a modern database, and will create applications for daily 
posting of taxpayer tax account and return data. 
 
The effects of these resource reallocations and potential deficiencies are of 
fundamental importance for this dissertation.  Important relevant questions are:  
 Did the reallocation mandated in the 1998 IRS Reform Act improve taxpayer 
perceptions of the IRS?   
 
• Were enforcement collections affected?  
• What was the effect on IRS personnel?  
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CHAPTER 2. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (NPM) 
Within the paradigm of public administration, researchers can apply managerial, 
political, or legal theories to examine government operations.  Within the managerial 
perspective, there are two subsets: 1) the traditional (orthodox) approach and 2) the 
reform approach (NPM).  Starting in the 1980s, NPM was advocated as a means to 
achieve greater governmental responsiveness to public demands.  Under NPM, 
governmental agencies seek to become effective and responsive to constituents.  In 
contrast, under traditional management, individuals are treated impersonally and the 
bureaucracy takes a rational (cost-benefit) mentality in serving the public.  Appendix II 
highlights differences between these two managerial approaches to public administration. 
Public administration in the United States (U.S.) traces its roots to President 
Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) seminal work, “The Study of Administration.”  In this work, 
Wilson called for a science of administration to occur with the “utmost possible 
efficiency.”  This bureaucratic orientation of government is based on the work of Max 
Weber and Frederick Taylor.  While centered on economy, efficiency and effectiveness, 
traditional management comes at the cost of impersonal rules.  Structure and strict 
adherence to rules are central tenets under the theory of traditional public administration.   
Movement towards NPM in the 1980s was motivated by public demands for 
improvement in the performance of the public sector.  Public anger was directly focused 
toward systems of taxation (an often cited initial example is the 1978 voter-initiated 
California Proposition 13 property tax revolt).   
Bagby and Franke (2001) observed that NPM views the science of “public 
administration” more as “public management.”  Often, an “attitude of customer service” 
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is seen as an appeal of this “liberation management model.”  Relative to the IRS, Bagby 
and Franke (2001, 626) specifically observed: 
At the IRS, accessibility and accountability encompassed in a new “customer 
friendly” feel have replaced the bureaucracy’s previously remote and 
authoritative style. 
 
The reform within the IRS was cited as coming from Former Vice President Al Gore’s 
“National Performance Review” (NPR).  This NPR was “the Clinton administration’s 
manifestation of the NPM approach” as described by Osborne and Gaebler (1992).  
Bagby and Franke (2001) observed that while NPM calls for a difference in management, 
the real issue is whether NPM makes for a better functioning governmental agency.  
(Importantly, the degree to which the IRS did or did not accomplish this legislative 
mandate utilizing the NPM orientation is a central motivation of this dissertation.)   
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) observed that governance involves a “complex set 
of interactions” and “complex value conflicts.”  They advocate viewing the general 
public as citizens, not as customers. They contend that while NPM is the “dominant 
paradigm,” it needs to have a broader and longer-term perspective.  Frederickson (1996) 
argued that NPM was the work of “scholars, theorists, and researchers” and a potential 
risk was the decreased ability to “implement policy.”  Hatry (1999) observed that results 
and efficiency were key attributes of agency performance under NPM.  Wise (2002, 556) 
observed that three competing drivers within NPM are: 
• Social equity (fair treatment),  
• Democratization (engaging citizens in bureaucracy), and  
• Humanization (employee focus).   
 14
These areas broadly parallel the three goals (service, enforcement, and IRS work 
environment) that the IRS adopted to implement the mandates of the 1998 IRS Reform 
Act.  Importantly, Wise observed that an NPM paradigm could be utilized in assessing 
administrative reform initiatives.  
From an accounting political perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) observed 
the effect of high information costs, heterogeneity of interests, and how organizational 
costs affect the “equilibrium outcome.”  The appearance of solving a problem is part of 
the political process.  Economic theories apply to proposed regulations, as well as 
existing regulations.  Government action (or lack thereof) is part of an “asymmetric loss 
function” occurring due to high information costs.   
Within the boundaries of the total federal budgetary process, Rosenbloom and 
Kravchuk (2002, 332) observed: 
Whatever course is taken in the future, however, one thing is certain – 
budgeting will remain an area of controversy for public administrators, elected 
officials, political executives, interest groups, commercial interests, and the 
public at large.  The way in which budgetary questions are framed has a great 











CHAPTER 3. TAX POLICY LITERATURE 
The focus of this research project is the internal administration of U.S. tax policy 
centered on the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  Crumbley (1973) observed that the behavioral 
aspects of taxation are typically disregarded in the passage of tax laws, although their 
implications for tax policy are significant in terms of keeping “social and economic 
systems under reasonable control.”   The following objectives of U.S. tax policy were 
recognized by Crumbley (1973, 759 direct quotes): 
1. Raising revenue 
2. Encouraging growth 
3. Stabilizing the economy 
4. Redistributing income and wealth 
5. Preaching morality 
6. Fulfilling morality 
Crumbley observed that accountants were ideally situated to conduct cost/benefit 
assessments of tax policy.  Crumbley (1973, 760) noted: 
The accounting profession is in a strategic position to undertake such analyses. 
But so far, accountants have been left at the starting gate by economists (and to 
some extent by the finance discipline) with respect to research on the behavioral 
aspect of tax laws.  
 
The potential erosion of tax principles based on substance over form and business 
purpose needs full and critical examination.  Importantly, within the area of tax 
avoidance,5 some of society’s most talented individuals are engaged in attempting to 
obtain tax privileges.  Accountants are ideally suited to the task of analyzing tax policy.   
                                                 
5 Tax avoidance is the legal avoidance of taxation, as opposed to tax evasion, which is illegal.  Almost all 
major accounting firms have had suspect tax shelters exposed in 2002/2003.  For example, KPMG’s capital 
gains shelter highlights that the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is not always 
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Drawing upon Crumbley’s (1973) call for accounting research in the behavioral 
implications of tax policy, Porcano (1984) evaluated tax policy through an experiment 
utilizing business school faculty and graduate business students.  Porcano observed the 
importance of “distributive justice” (fairness).  The study indicated a need for a balance 
of competing goals, and a regrettable facet of taxation is that it is “discriminatory by 
nature.”  If taxpayers do not perceive horizontal or vertical equity,6 then they potentially 
react through “tax evasion.”  As the late Senator Russell B. Long7 succinctly stated, 
“Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that other fella behind the tree.”  
Within a context of public choice models, Poterba (1998, 396) examined the 
relative lack of direct tax policy research in the area of tax reform, and he stated there is a 
need for “explaining why major tax reforms occur, why they occur when they occur, and 
why they take the forms that they do.”  Through a study of actual tax policy reforms, 
Birnbaum (1998) observed that while fundamental tax reform receives vocal support, the 
reality is that major reforms rarely occur (i.e., vocal support for reform is often no more 
than political rhetoric).  The effects of California’s Proposition 13 tax policy initiative 
and other states’ subsequent property tax reforms are subjects of numerous empirical 
examinations on pre- and post- enactment bases (see, for example, McGuire, 1999 and 
Sexton, Sheffrin, and O’Sullivan, 1999).   
                                                                                                                                                 
dichotomous.  Despite internal objections, KPMG decided not to register the tax shelter due to a 
cost/benefit assessment, a revenue culture, and a lax regulatory climate (Bryan-Low 2003).  Even Myron S. 
Scholes (Nobel Prize winner in Economics and co-author of the seminal Taxes and Business Strategy), in 
governmental questioning over his investment in Long-Term Capital Management’s tax schemes, declared, 
“I’m being trapped here” in regards to the contention of “no business purpose.” (Johnston 2003). 
6 Under horizontal equity, taxpayers with similar incomes pay similar taxes; under vertical equity, 
taxpayers with higher incomes pay higher percentages of taxes.  
7 Former Senator Long served from 1948 to 1986.  Fifteen of those years he was the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee. He was considered such a master of tax legislation that Wall Street considered 
him the “fourth branch of government” (Donlan 2003).   
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Within this broad framework, Richardson and Hildreth (1998) observed that 
taxation is a “political process,” but an economic framework can be used to assess a tax 
structure.  They recognized the five central attributes of a viable tax structure as 
having/being “reliable, predictable growth of revenue,” “broad base and low rates” (were 
the goals of the 1986 Tax Reform Act), “economic development and growth,” “equitable 
and fair,” and “tax simplicity.” 
In a commentary, Shevlin (1999) observed that the three main areas of tax 
research are tax policy, tax planning, and tax compliance.  Tax planning is the main focus 
of empirical accounting research and often involves a corporate focal point.  Shevlin 
described tax policy as more descriptive within the “spirit of the positive approach.”  He 
observed that tax policy research could potentially have the greatest effect from a social 
standpoint.  However, this dichotomy is incomplete.  Tax policy can be and is examined 
from an empirical perspective.   
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), in an extensive summation of accounting 
empirical income tax research, stated that corporate tax shelter schemes have taken 
“aggressive interpretations of the tax law,” and they observed the decline in corporations’ 
share of the percentage of total tax paid.  They called for tax policy empirical research 
into this apparent phenomenon. 
Utilizing a three stage empirical model (complexity → unfairness→ evasion), 
Forest and Sheffrin (2002) examined the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey from an   
economic perspective to gauge the effect that tax simplification would have on 
compliance [the article counters the Michael Graetz (1997) call for simplifying taxation].  
An outside consulting firm administered the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey 
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nationwide.  Nearly 1,800 taxpayers were interviewed (resulting in 1,194 usable surveys).  
The survey lasted approximately 30 minutes and had two versions (80% of the questions 
were identical in the two surveys).  Forest and Sheffrin contend that the critical attribute 
for compliance was found to be the perception of fairness, not the effect of complexity 
per se.  From an NPM paradigm, highly relevant parts of the article were that findings 
from the survey included (Forest and Sheffrin, 2002, 80 and 82):  
 Taxpayers in 1990 perceived the chance of an audit at a relatively high 15 
percent. 
 
 Taxpayers sought outside help 52 percent of the time. 
 
This survey has been obtained from the National Archives, and questions with an “NPM-
related” focus were re-asked of taxpayers to gauge their perceptions.    
Through an examination of state and local revenue streams, Tannenwald (2002) 
observed that from a public finance perspective there is an awareness of a potential 
decline in the overall systems of taxation on the state and local level.  He called for the 
evaluations of long-term trends in tax policy administration, which are directly relevant 
to the federal level.  In a study centered on the effect of a single tax act, Mackie (2002) 
assessed the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act8 in terms of capital income taxation 
through effective tax rate analysis.  He observed the “complexity involved in tax policy 
analysis” and focused on the implications of tax policy changes occurring in one year. 
Tax policy was analyzed by Harmelink and VanDenburgh (2002) through 
utilization of General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, Treasury Inspector General of 
Tax Administration (TIGTA) reports, and an internal IRS study.  An internal IRS study, 
obtained under a Freedom of Information request, showed that “only 19% of tax law 
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questions were answered correctly” by the IRS in 2000/2001.9  In contrast, Hite (2002) 
utilized an IRS conducted survey to document an audit process system with an 85 percent 
positive rating among audited taxpayers in 1998.  It is important to note that the survey 
that Hite used was limited to a sample of taxpayers audited by the IRS in 1998 and was 
directly administered by the IRS.  In contrast, the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey 
was a nationwide survey of randomly selected taxpayers and was conducted/administered 
by an outside consultant. Hite concluded that “negative reports – should be weighed 
cautiously against these positive reports.”  The directly conflicting Hite and 
Harmelink/VanDenburgh studies were cross-sectional in nature.  
Extending this literature stream that focuses on the IRS’s administration, 
Harmelink, Porcano, and VanDenburgh (2003) utilized GAO reports on the IRS for the 
calendar year 2002 and documented a tax system with potentially chronic problems.  The 
GAO appeared to present the ongoing modernization efforts in a favorable light, but the 
details contained within the reports indicated otherwise. 
In summary, the limited available research indicates that tax administration is a 
complicated endeavor involving conflicting trade-offs.  Various methodologies have been 
utilized in examining the effect of tax policy changes.  An assessment of the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act from an accounting and public administration tax policy perspective adds to 
this sparse literature stream and to the understanding of tax administration.  The 1998 
IRS Reform Act was a unique event in that the IRS’s methodology to taxation was 
altered for the first time since 1952.  Importantly, the prior literature called for or 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 The 1986 tax reform did not center on IRS administration changes, but was meant to simplify the U.S. tax 
code (the goal was for a “broad base and low rates”).  
9 Later, a 2003 TIGTA audit found that the IRS incorrectly prepared tax returns 83 percent of the time 
when anonymous TIGTA auditors had returns prepared at Taxpayer Assistance Centers. 
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highlighted the need for the examination of tax policy reforms.  This dissertation assesses 
the implications of legislatively mandated changes to U.S. Tax Administration (radically 
transitioned from traditional management to NPM). 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN: HYPOTHESES AND TESTING 
This research project assesses whether the IRS has been successful in moving 
towards accomplishing the legislative mandate of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (i.e., “a well-
run IRS”).  This research contributes to the examination of U.S. tax policy and 
administration by partitioning IRS administration outcomes into pre- and post- enactment 
of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  As the GAO observed in May 2003 (GAO 2003, 1): 
Congress established the National Commission on Restructuring IRS in 1995 
and passed the Restructuring Act in 1998, which increased Congress’s oversight 
of the agency.  In passing the Act, Congress set two basic goals for IRS: 
improve service to taxpayers while continuing to enforce compliance with the 
tax laws.  
 
Importantly, the consequences of the 1998 IRS Reform Act now can be measured and the 
progress towards an NPM approach can be assessed.    
Partial replication of the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey combined with 
analyses of the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates of individual “tax misreporting,” 
the JCT’s annual assessments of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, and supplemental IRS data 
provided the foundation for empirically testing the following hypotheses.  Survey results 
and analyses of tax compliance and IRS personnel data were utilized to test the effects of 
an NPM approach on U.S. tax administration.  This approach is in contrast to prior 
studies that utilized data in cross-sectional designs, survey-only, and anecdotal evidence.  
Initial employment of univariate statistics identifies underlying patterns.  This study was 





4.1 Taxpayer Service 
A driving motivation behind the 1998 IRS Reform Act was the perception that the 
IRS’s treatment of taxpayers was “evil.”10  This perception resulted in an NPM 
orientation being legislatively mandated.  Specifically, §1002 of the Act reads: 
§1002. Internal Revenue Service Mission To Focus On Taxpayers’ Needs. 
The Internal Revenue Service shall review and restate its mission to place a greater 
emphasis on serving the public and meeting taxpayers’ needs. 
 
Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS are thus a major outcome variable of interest from the 
1998 IRS Reform Act.  In assessing potential changes in taxpayers’ perceptions of the 
IRS, the following hypothesis was tested. 
H1:  There is no change in taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS since the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act.   
 
This hypothesis was tested by re-asking selected questions from the IRS’s 1990 
Taxpayer Opinion Survey (a nationwide survey).11  The IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion 
Survey, data set, and written report have been obtained from the National Archives and 
Records Administration.   The goal of the survey was “to gauge the public’s mood after 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act and to gather trend data on issues of concern to the IRS.”  
Questions with an NPM-related focus were re-asked of taxpayers to determine potential 
differences in responses from 1990.  Additionally, four independent questions were asked 
centering on the overall fairness of the tax system, use of outside help, perceived audit 
potential, and type of tax form filed.   
                                                 
10 Supra note 1. 
11 This survey elicited taxpayers’ views on the IRS and U.S. Tax Administration from September through 
November of 1990 (Schulman 1991).  It employed “Refusal Conversion Letters” to encourage a high 
response rate (response rate of 63 percent was achieved).  Sample units were drawn based on housing units 
utilizing a cluster design.  
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Several questions were re-asked to allow for an assessment of differences 
between the 1990 responses and the 2004 responses.  A major goal of the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act was to favorably change taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s level of 
taxpayer service, while maintaining compliance.  In fact, the IRS’s first stated goal is to 
provide “top quality service to all taxpayers.” 
Differences or no differences in response patterns indicate the degree to which 
reforms were or were not successful, as well as indicate if any unintended consequences 
occurred.  A two-tail t-test for differences between two sample responses was conducted 
based on each individual sample question (method of compared comparison). 
                           n 
t = ∑ (x1– x2) / s/n1/2 
                                  i=1 
It is assumed that the two populations of taxpayers are approximately normally 
distributed.                            
Any response differences based on Louisiana filers (62 percent of those surveyed) 
versus other state filers, date of survey (April 15 versus later), and tax forms filed were 
analyzed for any potential biases.  The information on which tax forms were filed 
approximately segments taxpayers based on their income12 and reporting characteristics.   
Lower and upper income taxpayers were selectively targeted by altering survey 
locations.  Besides broadly classifying taxpayers by income information on which tax 
form was utilized provides insight to taxpayers’ income and deductions.  To file 1040-
EZ, a taxpayer must (instructions for 1040-EZ): 
 Not have income over $50,000 
 File single or jointly (not head of household or married filing separately) 
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 Not claim exemptions 
 Only have wages, taxable scholarships/grants, unemployment compensation 
or Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends 
 
 Have under $1,500 in interest income 
 Not have advance earned income credit payments (EIC) 
 Not have deductions or credits (other (EIC) 
To file 1040-A, taxpayers must have under $50,000 in income and can report limited 
sources of income.  Additionally, only certain income items can be reported.  Credits and 
adjustments are also limited.  Further, one cannot itemize; thus, the home interest 
deduction cannot be taken, among others items.  Differences in responses among the 
different tax filers were analyzed for any potential changes. 
 A short introduction explaining the purpose (PhD Dissertation) and subject (tax 
policy) of the survey was utilized to initiate the survey process.  A high voluntary 
participation rate was easily obtained.  See Appendix III for the actual survey 
instrument.13 
4.2 Taxpayer Compliance 
In conjunction with improving taxpayer service, the 1998 IRS Reform Act 
required that the IRS maintain taxpayers’ compliance with the IRC.  When the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act was passed, Congress believed that voluntary compliance would be enhanced 
when “public confidence” in the federal system of taxation was “restored” (JCT 1998, 
19).  In May 2003, the GAO observed, in mandated Congressional testimony, that the 
second major goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was for the IRS to maintain compliance 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 In 2003, a taxpayer had to have under $50,000 in income to utilize either the 1040EZ or 1040A.  
13 Optimal sample size calculations indicated a sample size of 168 surveys. 
 25
(GAO 2003, 1).14  The second hypothesis addresses this aspect of the 1998 IRS Reform 
Act:  
H2: There is no change in taxpayers’ compliance since the 1998 IRS Reform Act. 
 
Internal IRS data (pre- and post- 1998) was utilized to test for changes in the 
IRS’s compliance posture.  The proxy for taxpayers’ tax compliance is the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis - Adjusted Gross Income Gap (BEA-AGIG, 1958-2002).  The BEA 
compares its annual estimate of personal income to the income actually reported to the 
IRS to estimate the tax reporting gap (Park 2003, Ledbetter 2004A, and 2004B).  A series 
of modifications are made by the BEA to both their income estimate and to the AGI 
reported by the IRS to obtain comparability.   
The use of data contained in the Congressionally mandated annual JCT studies of 
the 1998 IRS Reform Act, in conjunction with the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ 
estimates of the AGI-Gap allowed for testing for any potential effects the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act had on compliance.  In April 2003, the JCT (2003, 69) requested that the 
Acting IRS Commissioner furnish information for the “Joint Review of the IRS Strategic 
Plans and Budget” as required under §8022(f)(3) of the IRC.  This information centered 
on key internal measures of the IRS’s enforcement posture.  
An exploratory multivariate linear regression model examined the IRS’s 
enforcement posture pre- and post- 1998.  The model consists of 6 independent 
variables15 drawn from variables identified in the JCT’s 2003 study of the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act:  
                                                 
14 The “fifth and final” joint congressional review of this Act occurred in 2003. (GAO 2003, 1). 
15 This data was obtained from the JCT studies (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) of the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act along with supplemental internal IRS data and Syracuse University’s Transactional Record 
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GAP = ßo + ß1ADT+ ß2LIT + ß3 HRS + ß4CHG + ß5R98 + ß6A86 + ß7A90 + e 
Where: 
GAP = BEA calculation of the yearly annual tax gap (expressed in terms of the 
percentage of total revenue); 
 
ADT = the number of IRS audit personnel;  
 
LIT = the number of returns the IRS successfully litigates; 
 
HRS = the average number of hours an IRS auditor spends auditing a return; 
 
CHG = the number of returns with changes after the IRS completes an audit; 
 
R98 = a dummy variable for the 1998 IRS Reform Act (1 if 1998 or beyond, 0 
otherwise) 
 
A86 = the 1986 Tax Act control variable for tax complexity/changes;  
 
A90 = the 1990 Tax Act control variable for tax complexity/changes; and 
 
e = a normally distributed error term. 
 
The dependent variable (gap) is based on the BEA calculation of the yearly 
annual tax gap.  The annual tax gap estimates are quantified in terms of the percentage of 
AGI-GAP (BEA-AGI minus IRS AGI) over total AGI as derived by the BEA.  
Expressing the AGI-Gap as a percentage controls for inflationary effects.  The tax income 
gap is estimated on an annual basis back to 1958.  A central question/issue of this 
dissertation is the effect, if any, the 1998 IRS Reform Act had on “tax-return 
misreporting.”    
Based on the language contained in the JCT’s data request, certain independent 
variable signs can be predicted.  Further, after the well-publicized 1998 IRS Reform Act, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Access Clearinghouse data. Models that incorporate lag variables were utilized as sensitivity tests to verify 
potential results.  The Tax-Changes variable is incorporated into later models and is actually two separate 
Tax Acts.   
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a new perception on audit risk was likely created.  Prior to 1998, taxpayers’ perceptions 
of their overall audit potential, as the IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey indicated, 
were higher than their actual audit potential (15 percent versus less than 5 percent actual 
overall).   
The first independent variable (ADT) is the number of IRS audit personnel.  It is 
predicted to be negatively related to the annual tax gap.  An increase in the number of 
audit personnel is expected to decrease the tax gap; conversely, a decrease in audit 
personnel is expected to increase the tax gap.   The second independent variable (LIT) 
represents the number of returns the IRS litigates (disputes that the IRS initiates).  A 
negative relationship is expected with the tax gap, as less IRS-initiated litigation results in 
an expected increase in the tax gap.  
The third independent variable (HRS) represents the number of hours spent 
auditing a return.  It is expected that the more hours needed to audit a return will increase 
the tax gap, as IRS personnel will be less productive in terms of the total number of 
audits completed due to greater taxpayer protection procedures (check lists, supervisory 
reviews, and overall greater sensitivity to taxpayers’ issues after the 1998 IRS Reform 
Act).  The fourth independent variable is the number of returns that have changes after an 
IRS audit (CHG).   CHG represents the number of audits the IRS completes where there 
are changes in taxes due.  It is predicted to be negatively related to the tax gap.  This 
variable is a proxy for the IRS’s audit aggressiveness.  
The effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98), the key variable of interest, is 
assessed with a dummy variable (1 if 1998 or beyond, 0 otherwise).16 While the prior 
                                                 
16 The model was also calculated by alternating the year of the 1998 IRS Reform Act variable (1997 or 
1998).    
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independent variables reflect changes resulting from the 1998 IRS Reform Act, their 
effect will only decrease the likelihood of finding a statistically significant relationship.  
If a positive relationship is detected, it may indicate that one of the unintended 
consequences of moving from a traditional management focus to an NPM focus is a 
decline in tax compliance.   
The number of tax law changes (Tax-Changes) in a given year are expected to 
proxy for the growing tax complexity and is a control variable. The major tax reform acts 
of 1986 and 1990 are utilized as proxies for any potential effect tax complexity/change 
has on the above model.   Smith, Harmelink and Hasselback, in a listing of Tax Acts 
since 1913, observed the following about these Acts (1-17 and 1-18): 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986: The IRC was re-titled the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986.  This tax act was the single most comprehensive and complex change 
in the history of U.S. taxation. 
 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990:  Many significant changes including the 
establishment of a three-rate structure of 15 percent, 28 percent and 31 percent. 
A preferential capital gains rate of 28 percent was instituted. 
 
The 1986 Tax Act legislated a systematic change in tax policy (broad base and low rates).  
While many Code sections were simplified, many complex provisions such as passive 
activity loss rules and private activity bond rules came into existence for the first time.  
The 1990 Act began the initial undoing of many of the 1986 changes.  In 1988, the JCT 
(1998, 142) observed that Congress was aware that growing complexity strains the IRS’s 
and taxpayers’ abilities to comply. 
The model is run in various forms due to data restrictions (data for audit hours 
and change-returns is available only back to 1992) and to control for possible serial 
correlation. When utilizing time series data sets, serial correlation is often present.  If 
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serial correlation is present, the assumption of independent error terms (i.e., residuals are 
correlated with their lag values) is violated, and an unadjusted regression model is an 
inappropriate model specification.  To test for the presence of serial correlation, Durbin-
Watson test statistics were calculated.17  When serial correlation is present, the first 
difference technique is used to alleviate the problem. 
4.3 IRS’s Personnel Environment 
 
The third hypothesis addresses the degrees to which the IRS has made changes to 
the working environment within the IRS (as called for in “Subtitle C-Personnel 
Flexibilities” of the 1998 IRS Reform Act).  The JCT’s 2003 annual review requested 
data on the IRS’s executive compensation and employee termination.  The following 
hypothesis was tested. 
H3: There is no change in the IRS’s employee work environment since the 1998    
IRS Reform Act. 
 
Examination of the information furnished as to the effect of §1201 (IRS executive 
compensation) and §1203 (IRS employee termination) was utilized in testing this 
hypothesis.   Questions were specifically asked about the authority granted to the IRS to 
better compete for top executives under “streamlined critical pay authority.” Under 
§1201, “Improvements In Personnel Flexibilities,”  
The Secretary of the Treasury may, for a period of 10 years after the date of 
enactment of this section, establish, fix the compensation of, and appoint 
individuals to designated critical administrative, technical, and professional 
positions needed to carry out the functions of the Internal Revenue Service. 
 
These “critical pay positions” were created in the 1998 IRS Reform Act to allow for 
greater compensation than authorized under the civil service system.  A comparison of 
                                                 
17 A Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic greater than 2.5 or less than 1.5 would generally indicate serial 
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the compensation of recently hired IRS executives to their most recent salaries was 
conducted to partially test hypothesis three.18   A two-tailed t-test for differences between 
IRS and private salaries was calculated to determine whether the differences were 
significant.   
Questions were asked concerning the ten conditions under which an IRS 
employee could be dismissed, established under the 1998 IRS Reform Act (and several 
prior Acts).  These conditions dealt with seizure procedures, providing false information, 
violation of constitutional and civil rights, altering documentation, abusing a taxpayer, 
lack of adherence to formal policy, misleading congressional inquires, failure to file a 
proper return, intentionally understating a tax liability, and threatening a taxpayer.  This 
section was enacted, in large part, as a direct result of Congressional hearings that 
centered on public outrage over the irony of IRS employees pursuing non-filers when 
certain IRS employees themselves were, in fact, not filing.  Employee personnel 
termination decisions under this Act were examined to determine the overall effect.  In 
2003, the IRS asked Congress to rescind certain aspects of this code section in its 2003 
budget request because it contended it caused more administrative problems than it was 
worth.  However, in 2004, the IRS, when confronted with an employee filing scandal, 
apparently had second thoughts. 
The Congressional intent of this termination provision is indicated in that only the 
Commissioner can override termination for violations (non-delegable).  As the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act states ((§1203(C)(2) and (3)): 
                                                                                                                                                 
correlation.  A DW statistic of 2.0 indicates no serial correlation. 
18 The Congressional reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act collected data on IRS executives’ prior salaries 
and their current IRS salaries.  For example, IRS executives hired in 2002 had their immediate prior 
salaries compared to their new IRS salaries. 
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The exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall be at the sole discretion of 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and may not be delegated to any other 
officer. … Any determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under 
this subsection may not be appealed in any administrative or judicial proceeding.    
 
Section §1203 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act is often referred to as the “10 deadly sins” 
because it called for the termination of IRS employees if they are violated.  Both 
personnel termination and executive compensation changes were major administrative 
provisions of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  
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CHAPTER 5. DATA, RESULTS, AND INITIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 Sections 5.1 (Taxpayer Service), 5.2 (Taxpayer Compliance), and 5.3, (IRS 
Personnel Environment) use various research methodologies to assess the effect of the 
1998 IRS Reform Act.  Taxpayer service is assessed with a partial replication of a 1990 
Taxpayer Opinion Survey.  Taxpayer compliance is analyzed by regressing the BEA-AGI 
gap on key enforcement measures as identified by the JCT.  The IRS personnel 
environment is examined by comparing IRS executive salaries to their prior private sector 
pay and legislatively mandated employee terminations.  Initial implications of the data 
results are contained within each section and then an overall comprehensive implication 
chapter follows. 
5.1 Taxpayer Service 
The first hypothesis predicts no change in taxpayer perceptions of the IRS 
resulting from the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  NPM-related questions were selected from the 
IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey and re-asked of taxpayers to determine if there 
were any differences in responses.19  Additionally, several questions were asked to 
determine whether taxpayers surveyed in 1990 and 2004 were comparable.  Four 
independent questions on general taxation issues were also asked.  The results of the 
2004 survey were then compared to 1990 survey results.  The results of comparing the 
surveys were then analyzed in the context of NPM.  The 2004 survey responses were then 
partitioned based on state of residence, date of filing, and type of form filed to determine 
any potential biases in survey results (generally, there were none).  
Taxpayers surveyed in 1990 and 2004 were statistically measured on the use of a 
third party to help in preparing returns (almost identical results).  Similar results were 
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also obtained with the type of tax form filed and taxpayers’ perceived audit potential.  
These similarities indicate comparable taxpayers were surveyed in both 1990 and 2004.  
In 1990 and 2004, taxpayers were asked whether they sought help in filing tax forms in 
the last couple of years.  The question was: 
During the past few years, how often have you completed your tax forms 
yourself, instead of getting help from someone else? Would you say you always 
do them yourself, usually do, sometimes do, or never do them yourself?  
 
The U-shaped frequency distribution of responses is nearly identical for the 1990 and 
2004 surveys as shown in Figure 1 (which is an indication that similar taxpayers were 













Use of a Third Party by Taxpayers to Prepare Tax Returns 
Taxpayers were asked if they had outside help in filing their tax forms.  There were 239 usable 
observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  For three respondents, no response was 
obtained. 
 
Taxpayers in 1990 and 2004 were asked which tax form they filed.  This question 
enabled respondents to be broadly classified by their income (1040EZ and 1040A can 
only be filed if taxpayers had under $50,000 in income in 2003).  The frequency 
distribution in Figure 2 shows that a broad range of taxpayers were surveyed and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Surveys were collected from a variety of locations, including U.S. post offices, airports, bus and train 
terminals, offices, conferences, and school events.   
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Forms Filed by Taxpayers 
Taxpayers were asked which tax forms they had filed (1040-EZ, 1040-A or 1040).  There were 
203 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  Thirty one respondents were 
unsure which tax form they filed.  
 
The decline in 1040 filers is likely due to the “not sure” response rate of 17 percent in 
2004, which is considerably higher than the 6 percent in 1990.  In the 1990 survey, 
taxpayers were shown blank copies of tax forms; this was not done in 2004 based on the 
pilot study results (which showed that administration would not be cost-beneficial). 
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 reflect that there was homogeneity in the populations 
sampled and tested; thus, the results of the two surveys are comparable.  The question on 
use of a third party preparer and which tax form was filed enables taxpayers to be broadly 
classified and they are a good indication of whether similar taxpayers were interviewed 
when comparing those surveyed in 1990 to 2004. 
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Taxpayers were asked, “Have you already filed a federal income tax return for 
last year – that is 2003 – or are you planning to file an income tax return?”  The 
responses to this question are reflected in Table 4. 
Table 4 






Taxpayers were asked if they plan to file a return. There were 232 usable observations for this 
question in the 2004 survey.  Twelve respondents were not sure whether or not they would file a 
return.  
 
Of taxpayers surveyed, nearly 94 percent had filed a return and 6 percent were not 
planning to file (taxpayers under certain income levels are not required to file returns).  
For purposes of simplicity and because all persons in the U.S. pay some taxes (for 
example, sales taxes), respondents to the survey are referred to as taxpayers in the 
dissertation, regardless of their intent to file a tax return for tax year 2003.   
Taxpayers were asked a set of questions directly centering on the IRS.  These 
questions dealt specifically with NPM-related issues (a central focus of this dissertation).  
These questions were re-asked and scaled in exactly the same manner and order as they 
were asked in the 1990 IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey.  When taxpayers were asked the 
questions, they could respond based upon the following 6 point scale: 
 1 strongly agree 
 2 agree 
 3 somewhat agree 
 4 somewhat disagree 
 5 disagree 
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 6 strongly disagree 
 7 not sure (in the following figures, this category is not reflected; the 
number of usable observations, however, is reflected below the figures)  
 
 
Thus, the lower the score, the better the IRS is perceived by those surveyed (this is the 
exact methodology that was in the original IRS 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey).  The 
higher the score, the less favorable opinion the taxpayer has of the IRS.   
Table 5 reflects the mean scores of the respondents and compares the 2004 
responses to the 1990 responses. 
Table 5 



































1. IRS employees are just as 
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2. I am confident that the IRS 
would never try to take more 














      
3. You can depend on the IRS 
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This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically 
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.  
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The IRS was perceived as performing significantly worse in the areas of correctly 
assessing taxpayers’ obligations (“take more money”) and “investigating their own 
people” (both P-values under .001 )  Overall, Table 5 reflects that taxpayers’ perceptions 
of the IRS have not improved in four NPM-related areas and in two NPM-related areas 
the IRS scored statistically worse.  Failure to find any improvement in conjunction with 
two significant evaluations (P-values under .001) of perceived decreases in taxpayer 
service strongly implies that there has been no improvement and perhaps an overall 
decline. 
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the frequency distribution of responses from 1990 to 
2004 relative to the first NPM-related question (whether “IRS employees are just as 
knowledgeable as any private tax expert”).  Notably, taxpayers who strongly agree with 
this statement declined from 15 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2004, which indicates a 
decrease in taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS from the standpoint of receiving a “top 
quality” response.   
The IRS in 2004 generally received more favorable evaluations on this IRS 
employee knowledge question in 1990 in the other five categories (“agree” through 
“strongly disagree”).  The IRS had higher positive responses for “agree” and “somewhat 












































IRS Employees’ Knowledge 
Taxpayers were asked if “IRS employees are just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert.” 
There were 204 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  Forty respondents 
were unsure as to the IRS employees’ knowledge. 
 
The second NPM-related question asked whether the subject was “confident that 
the IRS would never try to take more money from me than they should.”  Taxpayers 
“strongly agreed” with this statement nearly 20 percent of the time in 1990.  In 2004, less 
than 5 percent agreed with this statement.  Conversely, 20 percent of taxpayers disagreed 
with the statement in 2004.  In 1990, only 11 percent disagreed.  The frequency 
distribution of taxpayers’ responses is shown in Figure 4.   
The third NPM-related question in this set inquired as to taxpayers’ opinion on 
whether they could “depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records.”  In 1990, 17 
percent of those surveyed strongly agreed with this statement.  In 2004, only 5 percent 











































IRS and Taxpayers’ Money 
Taxpayers were asked, “I am confident that the IRS would never try to take more money from 
me than they should.” There were 232 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  












































IRS Record Keeping 
Taxpayers were asked, “You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records.” There were 
234 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  Ten respondents were unsure on 




2004. The response categories “agree,” and “somewhat disagree” were similar in 1990 
when compared to 2004.  The frequency distribution of answers is shown in Figure 5: 
The fourth NPM-related question asked, “When it comes to investigating their 
own people, the IRS is as thorough as they are with everyone else.”  On this question, 
taxpayers graded the IRS less favorably on “strongly agree,” “agree,” and “somewhat 










































Investigating Their Own People 
Taxpayers were asked, “When it comes to investigating their own people, the IRS is as thorough 
as they are with everyone else.”  There were 185 usable observations for this question in the 
2004 survey.  Fifty-nine respondents were unsure as to this issue.  This category had the highest 
number of “unsure” responses.  
 
The fifth NPM-related question in this set asked, “Employees who work for the 
IRS display a high degree of honesty and integrity.”  Taxpayers in 1990 strongly agreed 
with this statement 12 percent of the time.  In 2004, this percentage dropped nearly in 
half to 6.5 percent of the time.  On the other potential responses, the IRS had nearly 











































IRS Employees’ Honesty and Integrity 
Taxpayers were asked, “Employees who work for the IRS display a high degree of honesty and 
integrity.”  There were 205 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  Thirty-nine 
respondents were unsure on this issue.   
 
 
From the standpoint of changes mandated by the 1998 IRS Reform Act, this question and 
the following question are particularly strong measures of Congressional desires in 
passing the 1998 legislation. 
The last NPM-related survey question asked whether “IRS procedures and 
practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the rights of taxpayers.”  Once again, 
taxpayers were less likely to strongly agree with this statement when comparing results 
from 2004 to that of 1990.  For the rest of the responses, taxpayers responded similarly 
when comparing the two years (IRS tended to score slightly better in 2004).  (See Figure 
8.)  
Table 6 reflects a consistent trend of a lower score on the “strongly agree” 
response (most favorable to the IRS) for all six questions centering on NPM. This 
strongly implies that taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have decreased relative to the 
IRS’s strategic goals of providing “top quality service to each taxpayer,” which was the 
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first stated IRS goal after the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  The reason for universal decrease is 
unclear, but it is plausible that the 1998 IRS Reform Act did not increase taxpayers’ 
rating of the IRS most favorable response category when comparing 2004 survey results 










































Fairness of IRS’s Procedures and Practices 
Taxpayers were asked, “IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect 
the rights of taxpayers.” There were 223 usable observations for this question in the 2004 
survey.  Twenty-one respondents were unsure on this issue. 
 
Table 6 








1. IRS employees are just as 
knowledgeable as any private tax expert. 8% 15% -7% 
2. I am confident that the IRS would never 
try to take more money from me than they 
should. 5% 18% -13% 
3. You can depend on the IRS to keep 
accurate tax records. 5% 17% -12% 
4. When it comes to investigating their own 
people, the IRS is as thorough as they are 
with everyone else. 4% 20% -16% 
5. Employees who work for the IRS display 
a high degree of honesty and integrity. 7% 12% -5% 
6. IRS procedures and practices are fair and 
reasonable ones that respect the rights of 
taxpayers. 5% 11% -6% 
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The IRS’s intent to provide taxpayers with high quality service is reflected 
additionally in its opening statements in the annual 1040 instructions (included since 
1998 in the 1040 instructions).  Specifically, IRS annually inserts the IRS mission (2003 
1040 instructions, 2):  
The IRS Mission: Provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping 
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law 
with integrity and fairness to all. 
  
After the initial six questions (which focused on NPM-related issues), four broader 
independent questions also were asked (also from the original 1990 survey).  A question 
dealt with taxpayers’ overall perceptions of the tax system.  Taxpayers were asked: 
How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 2003 
tax return – do you feel it is quite fair to most people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most people?  
 
Here taxpayers had much more favorable views of the U.S. tax system than they 
had in 1990.  Almost 50 percent of taxpayers surveyed in 2004 viewed the system 
favorably compared to only 35 percent in 1990.  Additionally, the 2004 trend of a more 















Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Overall Fairness of System 
Taxpayers were asked their perception on the overall fairness of the taxation system.  There were 




The JCT observed in 1998 (JCT 1998, 19): 
The Congress believed that a well-run IRS is critical to the operation of our tax 
system. Public confidence in the IRS must be restored so that our system of 
voluntary compliance will not be compromised. The Congress believed that 
most Americans are willing to pay their fair share of taxes, and that public 
confidence in the IRS is key to maintaining that willingness. 
 
Despite a general decrease in taxpayers’ favorable perceptions of the IRS, their 
overall perception of the U.S. tax system improved markedly.   Evidently, factors other 
than taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS affect their view of U.S. taxation, e.g., tax rates 
which declined from 1990 to 2004.  A stated goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to 
increase the public’s favorable perception of the overall federal taxation process and this 
goal has been achieved according to those surveyed.  The extent to which the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act is affecting this view is debatable, based on the decline in taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the IRS, as reflected in the previous six questions.    
An audit question was asked in the survey. The question was shortened based on 
pilot testing of the original two-page survey.  It was condensed to make the survey flow 
better, make it clearer to those surveyed, and to format the survey on one page.  The 
question centered on taxpayers’ perceptions of their audit potential.  In the 1990 survey 
the question read: 
As you may know, an audit is when you have to go to an IRS office or they 
come to your house or business or they may correspond with you, and you are 
asked to prove your deductions or answer questions about your tax return. The 
question I have is: out of every 100 taxpayers at your income level, how many 
or what percent do you think were audited last year? (Scale on percentage 
basis.) 
 
The 2004 survey question was shortened to: 
An audit is when the IRS asks you to prove your deductions or answer questions 
about your tax return (either in person or through the mail). Out of every 100 
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taxpayers at your income level, what percent do you think were audited last 
year? (Scale on percentage basis.)  
 
In 1990, taxpayers on average perceived their audit potential at 16 percent.20  In 2004, 
taxpayers perceived this potential as increasing to 18 percent.  In 1990, taxpayers had 
under a 5 percent chance of actually being audited; in 2003, the actual number of returns 
audited had in fact decreased to less than one percent of returns filed.  Table 7 shows the 
frequency distribution of the perceived audit potential in 2004. 
Table 7 
Taxpayers’ Perceived Percentage of IRS Audits 
2.5% or lower 20%
Over 2.5% to 5%  11%
Over 5% to 10% 12%
Over 10% to 20% 12%
Over 20% to 30% 22%
Over 50% 5%
Taxpayers were asked their perceived IRS audit potential. There were 199 usable observations 
for this question in the 2004 survey.  Forty-five respondents stated they were unsure of the audit 
rate. 
 
Taxpayers correctly perceived their audit potential at “2.5 percent or less” 20 percent of 
the time.  Clearly, the IRS Commissioner and the IRS enforcement division would 
contend that this gross over-assessment of audit potential is highly favorable. The IRS 
would likely contend it is an intended consequence of selective high profile enforcement 
action.  For example, the IRS routinely targets high profile enforcement action around the 
annual April 15 filing deadline.  Additionally, the IRS often holds press conferences 
concerning new enforcement initiatives during the beginning of the year. 
5.1.1 Survey Results in the Context of NPM 
 
Senator J. Robert Kerrey and Representative Rob Portman, chief architects of the 
1998 IRS Reform Act, observed that this legislation was enacted to change the public’s 
                                                 
20 The 1990 survey only provided the raw percentage response to this survey category.    
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view of the IRS’s unfairness to taxpayers.  The survey results in the current study overall 
indicate that this principal goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act has not been achieved.  In 
two of the six NPM-related areas surveyed, the IRS performed statistically significantly 
(P-values of less than .001) worse, and in no case did the IRS perform better.  
Importantly, in the question that centered directly on “confidence” in the IRS, there was a 
statistically significant decline (P-value of .0002).  Additionally, the IRS received 
universal decreases on the “strongly agree” response across all NPM-related survey 
questions.  (“Strongly agree” is the most favorable response for the IRS.) 
NPM requires that individuals be treated as customers, not as impersonal parts of 
the process.  The IRS, in adopting the legislative mandate of an NPM orientation, 
specifically incorporated as part of its radically revised mission statement that taxpayers 
receive “top quality service.”  Bagby and Franke (2001 at 262) observed that the IRS’s 
goal was to achieve a “new customer friendly feel.”  Survey results strongly indicate that 
this central tenet of an NPM methodology was not achieved.  From an accounting 
perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) observed that an “asymmetric loss function” 
was part of the political process, and often legislation was enacted that in the end analysis 
only appeared to solve the problem.  Based on this survey, this conclusion can be 
reasonably asserted as occurring in the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  Thus, the IRS 
implementation of an NPM methodology is unsuccessful from a taxpayer’s perspective, a 
key outcome measure. 
5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The 2004 results are further analyzed based on the state of residence (Louisiana 
versus non-Louisiana), date of survey (April 15 versus non April 15) and type of tax form 
filed (1040EZ, 1040A and 1040).  In general, the partitioned results were similar, and 
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differences that were found tended to support (or strengthen) the overall implications of 
the survey.   
5.1.3 Partitioning Respondents by State of Residence 
 
The state of residence of the respondents is reflected in Table 8: 
Table 8 













Other states 16 6.60%
This table shows the state of residence for taxpayers surveyed.  Other states had three or fewer 
observations.  There were 241 usable observations for this question in the 2004 survey.  Three 
respondents did not give their state of residence. 
 
Of those surveyed, 67 percent resided in Louisiana; the remaining taxpayers came from a 
variety of states (18 different states other than Louisiana in total).  With the majority of 
taxpayers residing in Louisiana a bias in the results could potentially occur.  Therefore, in 
order to assess any possible bias, the survey responses were recalculated based on results 
from Louisiana residents versus non-Louisiana residents.  Table 9 shows that the results 
of the NPM-related questions were not significantly different across home states.  
Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s taxpayer service do not improve when splitting the 
sample based on Louisiana versus other states.  This result would reflect little or no bias 
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This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues partitioned by taxpayers’ state 
of residence. They were scaled identically on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = 
somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 = disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower 
the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.  Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant 
P-values are bolded.   
 
 The next four questions center on the fairness of the system, propensity to obtain 
outside tax preparation assistance, audit potential, and the type of tax form filed.  As 
before, the results are not significantly different (as shown in Table 10). The non-
Louisiana audit rate potential perception of 16.6 percent is similar to the 1990 survey 
result of a perceived audit rate potential of 15.9 percent.  However, none of the results 
were significantly different statistically.  Tables 10 and 11 strongly indicate that there is 
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1. How do you feel about the 
federal income tax system as it 
applies to the 2003 tax return – 
do you feel it is quite fair to most 
people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair 
to most people?  
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = 
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat 





















2. During the past few years, how 
often have you completed your 
tax form yourself, instead of 
getting help from someone else? 
Would you say you always do 
them yourself, usually do, 
sometimes do or never do them 
yourself?  
(Scale: 1 = always do yourself, 2 
= usually do, 3 = sometimes do, 

























3. An audit is when the IRS asks 
you to prove your deductions or 
answer questions about your tax 
return (either in person or 
through the mail). Out of every 
100 taxpayers at your income 
level, what percent do you think 
were audited last year?  

























4. Which of the following forms 
did you use the last time you 
filed?  
a. 1040-EZ  
b. 1040-A  
c. 1040  (long form) 
d. 1040 (long form, plus)  
e. Don’t remember 
(Scale: 1 = 1040-EZ, 2 = 





















These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other. 
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The non-Louisiana audit rate potential perception of 16.6 percent is similar to the 1990 
survey result of a perceived audit rate potential of 15.9 percent.  However, none of the 
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results were significantly different statistically.  Tables 10 and 11 strongly indicate that 
there is no bias by having a majority of Louisiana residents in the survey. 
5.1.4 Partitioning Respondents by Date Surveyed 
A total of 244 taxpayers were surveyed in the months of April (61 taxpayers), 
May (150 taxpayers), and June (33 taxpayers).  Potentially, taxpayers could respond 
differently when they are in the process of filing a return than when they are not.  When 
partitioning the first set of NPM-related questions by date of survey, similar results were 
obtained on the first four questions.  On the final two questions, significantly negative 
differences were obtained (P-values of .0158 and .0631).  These differences on IRS 
employees’ honesty and integrity and IRS’s practices would indicate that the IRS fares 
worse with taxpayers in these two areas after the April 15th filing season. 
Table 11 
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions, 
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Taxpayers’ responses were split based on the dates they were surveyed (April 15, or later). This 
first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically on a 
six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 = 
disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS. 
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The overall implications that have been discussed for the NPM-related questions hold 
when the survey data is partitioned based on date of survey.  As in the prior tables, the 
split results only strengthen the implications that taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS have 
not improved since the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  In the areas of IRS employee honesty and 
IRS practices, the IRS was rated statistically worse (P-values of .0158 and .0631) by 
those surveyed after April 15.   
 The next four questions centering on the fairness of system, outside tax 
preparation help, audit potential, and type of tax form had similar results, as reflected in 
Table 12.  Only the question on perceived audit potential was significantly different (P-
values of .0585).  
Table 12 
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions, 




















1. How do you feel about the federal 
income tax system as it applies to the 2003 
tax return – do you feel it is quite fair to 
most people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair to most 
people?  
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = reasonably fair, 3 




























2. During the past few years, how often 
have you completed your tax form 
yourself, instead of getting help from 
someone else? Would you say you always 
do them yourself, usually do, sometimes do 
or never do them yourself? (Scale: 1 = 
always do yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 = 





























3. An audit is when the IRS asks you to 
prove your deductions or answer questions 
about your tax return (either in person or 
through the mail). Out of every 100 
taxpayers at your income level, what 
percent do you think were audited last 





















4. Which of the following forms did you 
use the last time you filed?  
a. 1040-EZ  
b. 1040-A  
c. 1040  (long form) 
d. 1040 (long form, plus)  
e. Don’t remember 


























Taxpayers’ responses were split based on the dates they were surveyed (April 15 or later). These 
were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other. Mean 
scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
An interesting result was that taxpayers perceived the potential of a tax audit 
much higher around April 15 than afterwards.  Taxpayers perceived a 24 percent 
potential of an audit on April 15, whereas later this perceived audit potential dropped to 
17 percent.  This 30 percent decline is both practically and statically significant (P-value 
of .0585).  The IRS in the days leading up to April 15 has historically used the public 
media to emphasize its enforcement efforts (for example, announcements of high profile 
tax litigation).  These efforts appear to heighten taxpayers’ awareness of the potential for 
IRS audits of tax returns and thus are likely successful. 
 Overall, results are similar, regardless of when taxpayers were interviewed.  
Implications of total survey results are only strengthened when data is split, based on 
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state of residence or by date surveyed. Taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS’s taxpayer 
service hold, regardless of the prior two data partitions. 
5.1.5 Partitioning Respondents by Tax Form Filed 
 In order to evaluate whether taxpayers’ responses varied by their income, the 
results were broken down by the tax forms that they filed (taxpayers must use one of 
three filing forms: 1040-EZ, 1040-A, or 1040).  Taxpayers could only file the 1040-EZ 
and 1040-A if they have under $50,000 in Adjusted Gross Income in 2003.  Additionally, 
taxpayers are limited by what types of income and deductions that can be reported on 
forms 1040-EZ and 1040-A. 
 The difference between 1040-EZ and 1040-A is the first partition.  On the first six 
NPM-related questions, there are no significantly different results as reflected in Table 
13.   
Table 13 
Mean Scores for the NPM-Related Questions, 
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This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically 
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.  
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The three independent questions (overall system of taxation, degree of return 
assistance, and audit potential) are not significantly different as reflected in Table 14.  
1040-A taxpayers perceived their audit potential at 18 percent as opposed to 1040-EZ 
filers who perceived a 26 percent rate (likely insignificant due to smaller sample sizes).  
Table 14 
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions, 

















1. How do you feel about the 
federal income tax system as it 
applies to the 2003 tax return – 
do you feel it is quite fair to most 
people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair 
to most people?  
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = 
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat 

























2. During the past few years, how 
often have you completed your 
tax form yourself, instead of 
getting help from someone else? 
Would you say you always do 
them yourself, usually do, 
sometimes do or never do them 
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do 
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 = 






























 Table Continued 
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3. An audit is when the IRS asks 
you to prove your deductions or 
answer questions about your tax 
return (either in person or 
through the mail). Out of every 
100 taxpayers at your income 
level, what percent do you think 
were audited last year? (Scale on 






























These three questions are independent of each other.  Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and 
significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The 1040 and 1040-EZ taxpayers’ survey results were split (see table 15).  On the 
last question, there was a significant (P-Value of .067) difference on whether taxpayers 
viewed IRS procedures as fair and reasonable (all other differences were insignificant).  
Taxpayers filing a 1040 had more negatively inclined opinions of the IRS.  A possible 
reason for a difference could be that higher-income taxpayers (1040 filers) would be 
more critical than lower-income taxpayers (1040-EZ filers) because they would pay a 
greater amount of taxes.  In the other five questions, the IRS’s mean scores remained 
above 3.0 (“somewhat agree”) and thus are negative, and all were not significantly 
different.   
Table 15 
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions, 
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This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically 
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.   
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
On the questions regarding fairness of the system and outside tax preparation 
help, similar results were obtained (Table 16).  There is a statistically significant 
difference (P-value of .0257) in perceived audit potential.   Taxpayers who file 1040’s 
saw their audit potential as 14 percent, as opposed to 1040-EZ taxpayers who perceived 
their audit potential as 26 percent.    
Table 16 
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions, 


















1. How do you feel about the 
federal income tax system as it 
applies to the 2003 tax return – 
do you feel it is quite fair to most 
people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair 
to most people?  
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = 
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat 




























2. During the past few years, how 
often have you completed your 
tax form yourself, instead of 
getting help from someone else? 
Would you say you always do 
them yourself, usually do, 
sometimes do or never do them 
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do 
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 = 






























3. An audit is when the IRS asks 
you to prove your deductions or 
answer questions about your tax 
return (either in person or 
through the mail). Out of every 
100 taxpayers at your income 
level, what percent do you think 
were audited last year? (Scale on 





























These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other.   
Mean scores, significant t-statistics and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
The final partition compares taxpayers who file 1040 versus 1040-A (Table 17).  
Here there were significant differences (P-values of less than .01) on three of the six 
questions (IRS knowledge, IRS and money, IRS’s ability to keep accurate tax records, 
and IRS procedures).   However, the IRS only received marginally positive ratings (mean 
scores below 3.0) by 1040-A filers in two categories (IRS knowledge and IRS 
procedures) and on the other four categories the IRS’s ratings were marginally negative.  
In other words, despite these two slightly different results, the implication that taxpayers 
do not perceive “top quality service” holds.  From an overall tax administration 
perspective, 1040 filers make up the vast majority of taxpayers and revenue contributors.  
Thus, their less favorable evaluations only add to the implications of a failure of the IRS 
to provide a high level of service. 
On the individual question concerning the overall tax system’s fairness, 1040 
filers’ responses were significantly worse (P-value of .0038) than 1040-A filers’ 
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responses. On the other two questions, the results were not significantly different, as 
reflected in Table 18. 
Table 17 
Mean Scores to NPM-Related Questions, 
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This first set of questions focused directly on NPM-related issues. They were scaled identically 
on a six point scale (1=strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 
= disagree, and 6 = strongly disagree).   The lower the score, the more favorable it is to the IRS.   
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
Taxpayers’ perceptions of their audit potential varied in a uniform pattern.  
Taxpayers with generally higher reporting requirements rated their audit potential the 
lowest and taxpayers with the least reporting requirements had the highest perceived 
audit potential.  From a tax compliance standpoint, one could argue that it is beneficial 
for the IRS that taxpayers perceive the audit potential to be greatly in excess of the actual 
rate.  Figure 10 reflects this pattern.   
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Table 18 
Mean Scores to Independent Survey Questions, 

















1. How do you feel about the 
federal income tax system as it 
applies to the 2003 tax return – 
do you feel it is quite fair to most 
people, or reasonably fair, or 
somewhat unfair, or quite unfair 
to most people?  
(Scale: 1 = quite fair, 2 = 
reasonably fair, 3 = somewhat 


















2. During the past few years, how 
often have you completed your 
tax form yourself, instead of 
getting help from someone else? 
Would you say you always do 
them yourself, usually do, 
sometimes do or never do them 
yourself? (Scale: 1 = always do 
yourself, 2 = usually do, 3 = 
sometimes do, 4 = never do them 






















3. An audit is when the IRS asks 
you to prove your deductions or 
answer questions about your tax 
return (either in person or 
through the mail). Out of every 
100 taxpayers at your income 
level, what percent do you think 
were audited last year? (Scale on 





















These were the last four questions asked of taxpayers and they are independent of each other.   
Mean scores, significant t-statistics, and significant P-values are bolded.   
 
 Taxpayers with the least revenue perceived their audit potential at greater than 25 
percent.  Conversely, taxpayers with the greatest revenue potential perceived less of an 
audit potential (15 percent).  In all cases, the perceived audit potential is not reflective of 
the current audit potential of about 1 percent.  The IRS’s audit activity is publicly 
perceived as much more prevalent than it actually is.  This vast overestimation of audit 




Taxpayers’ Perceived Differentiation in Audit Potential Versus Actual Audit Rate 
The above Figure reflects the perceived audit potential of taxpayers by the tax forms they file 










1040-EZ 1040-A 1040 Actual 
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5.2 Taxpayer Compliance 
Both within and outside the IRS, many assume that taxpayer compliance has 
decreased due to the IRS’s diversion of resources from its audit function into taxpayer 
service.  Treasury Secretary John Snow’s Congressional testimony from May 2004 reads 
in part (U.S. Department of Treasury 2004, 2): 
In past years, IRS’s focus has been on improving customer service.  We believe 
that we have been successful in that effort and are committed to further 
enhancing customer service for the vast majority of American taxpayers who do 
their best to pay their fair share. For those who do not, fundamental fairness 
requires that our enforcement efforts in FY 2005 continue moving us towards a 
tax system in which everyone is complying with the tax laws. Our FY 2005 
request, which includes a net increase of $300 million, will focus our resources 
toward enforcement initiatives designed to curb abusive tax practices, end the 
proliferation of abusive tax shelters, improve methods of identifying tax fraud, 
identify and stop promoters of illegal tax schemes and scams, and increase the 
number and effectiveness of audits to ensure compliance with the tax laws.  
 
However, the JCT, in its 1998 year-end analysis21 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act predicted 
that adoption of a customer service orientation by the IRS would “have no effect on 
Federal fiscal year budget receipts” (JCT 1998, 18). 
In order to empirically test the effect of the 1998 IRS Reform Act on taxpayer 
compliance, the tax gap measure of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) was studied 
in conjunction with major IRS enforcement measures that the JCT subsequently 
identified as key areas of concerns in its annual reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  
These variables include the number of tax auditors, successful IRS tax litigation, hours 
the IRS agents spent auditing returns, and no change rate (percentage of audits where the 
IRS accepts the return as filed).  The 1998 IRS Reform Act (the key variable of interest) 
is included as a binary variable in the model.   
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The proxy variable for taxpayer compliance is the BEA estimate of the Adjusted 
Gross Income Gap (AGI) from 1981 to 2001.  The AGI-Gap is converted to a percentage 
basis (BEA-AGI minus the IRS-AGI divided by the BEA-AGI, see Appendix IV).  













Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Adjusted Gross Income – Gap  
From 1981 to 2001 
The above Figure shows the BEA-calculated Adjusted Gross Income Gap (AGI-Gap) as a 
percentage of total BEA-AGI (BEA-AGI minus the IRS-AGI divided by the BEA-AGI).  
Utilizing a percentage basis overcomes inflationary influences.  A line is superimposed for year 
1998.  See Appendix IV for the data (BEA-AGI, IRS-AGI, BEA-Gap and BEA Gap percentage) 
in table form. 
 
The increase for 1998 could likely reflect that IRS enforcement activities were coming 
under intense public scrutiny in Congressional hearings and taxpayers reacted with a 
short–term decrease in compliance behavior.  The upward movement of 2001 could 
possibly reflect the growing perception of a lax enforcement environment by at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Within the tax profession, this year-end analysis by the JCT is commonly referred to as the “Blue Book” 
because of the color of its cover.  The JCT at year-end provides guidance/insight as to Congressional intent 
relative to tax laws enacted during the year.  This guidance is often considered authoritative.    
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some taxpayers (in the 2004 survey, 20% perceived the audit rate as 2.5 percent or lower) 
– a more long term effect.  
The IRS, in carrying out the mandates of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, reallocated 
direct audit personnel positions to other positions and divisions.  The total number of IRS 
personnel has remained fairly constant since 1997 at approximately 100,000 employees, 













IRS’s Total Personnel from 1981 to 2001 
This figure reflects the total IRS personnel including audit personnel on an annualized basis. A 
line is superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for data in table form. 
 
While total IRS employees remained constant from 1997 to 2002, the total 
number of IRS audit agents and auditors fell from 16,935 to 13,510 (a 20 percent 
decrease).   Additionally, audit personnel peaked in 1988 and 1989 when there were 














IRS Audit Personnel from 1981 to 2001 
The Figure reflects the total number of IRS auditors on an annualized basis. A line is 
superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for data in table form. 
 
The previous two Figures reflect that as a result of the 1998 IRS Reform Act a 
significant reallocation of resources occurred within the IRS.  Enforcement personnel 
were reallocated within the IRS to customer service positions.  As the JCT (1998, 33) 
observed, “The Commissioner announced a broad outline of a plan to reorganize the 
structure of the IRS in order to help make the IRS more oriented toward assisting 
taxpayers and providing better taxpayer service.”  The reality is that without an increase 
in total IRS personnel the IRS had to reassign personnel.   
This major realignment of resources within the IRS is likely to have affected other 
enforcement efforts.  The number of successful IRS tax litigation cases is hypothesized 
by the JCT to be related to the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  Figure 14 shows the number of 
successful tax litigation cases from 1981 to 2001, with a significant decline after the 1998 






































Successful IRS Tax Litigation Cases from 1981 to 2001 
This figure reflects the total number of successful IRS tax litigation cases on an annualized basis.  
A line is superimposed for year 1998.  See Appendix V for the above data in table form. 
 
While the number of successful litigations has declined since mid-1985, after the 1998 
IRS Reform Act this decreasing trend accelerated.  The year axis in Figure 14 is difficult 
to decipher.  More specifically, in 1997 there were 873 successful IRS prosecutions (a 
3% increase from 1996) and in 1998 there were only 766 (a 14% decline from 1997).  
See Appendix V for total IRS prosecutions from 1981 through 2001.  Other factors, 
besides the reallocation of IRS audit personnel, were part of the environment.  After 
1998, the IRS claims it was faced with mounting frivolous challenges when pursuing tax 
litigation.  The JCT (2003, 87) observed: 
The IRS Reform Act added several due process provisions that increased 
taxpayer rights during the collection process, such as pre-lien and pre-levy 
hearings and judicial review of such hearings. 
 
After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, successful tax litigation cases dropped nearly in half (as 
reflected in Figure 14).   
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The average time spent auditing a return was identified as an area of concern by 
the JCT in its review of the 1998 IRS Reform Act and is shown in Figure 15 (1992 to 
2001).  Since 1998, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of hours spent 
auditing a return due to additional audit procedures that were put into place to better 
protect taxpayer rights.  For example, extensive documentation requirements, checklists, 
and greater supervisory reviews were added after the 1998 IRS Reform Act to protect 
audited taxpayers’ rights.  Overall, certain IRS agents would contend that this increase in 
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Time IRS Agents Spent Auditing a Return from 1992 to 2001 
This figure reflects the number hours a typical IRS audit takes on an annualized basis.  A line is 
superimposed for year 1998. See Appendix V for the above data in table form. 
 
The number of audited tax returns with changes since 1992 is shown in Figure 16.  
Since 1998, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of audited returns with 
















Audited Tax Returns with Changes from 1992 to 2001This figure reflects the 
number of tax returns audited with changes on an annualized basis.  A line is superimposed for 
year 1998.  See Appendix V for data in table form. 
 
After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, a dramatic decrease in the number of audits with 
changes occurred (this trend is nearly continuous).  A likely factor in this change is a less 
aggressive audit posture on the part of IRS auditors.  As the JCT observed in 2003, “IRS 
employees frequently report that fear of a Section 120322 allegation causes reluctance to 
take appropriate enforcement actions” (JCT 2003, 45).  A limitation in adding the audit 
hour variable and the variable on IRS audit changes is that the data is only available back 
to 1992. 
 Proxies for tax complexity and changes are the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the 
magnitude of this Tax Act was so great that Congress re-designated the name of the tax 
code to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) and the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 
(which expanded the number of different tax rates from two to three and initiated the 
                                                 
22 Section 1203 of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was titled, “Termination of Employment for Misconduct.” It 
established ten conditions that would result in expedited termination of an IRS employee.  Audit personnel 
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undoing of many of the 1986 simplifications/changes).  Both of these Acts are modeled 
as binary variables, as is the variable of interest, the 1998 IRS Reform Act.   
In general, the effect from the above enforcement measures on the number of 
audit agents, tax litigation, time spent auditing a return, and no change rate are likely 
interrelated.  The IRS is planning to focus on improving enforcement through a multi-
step process incorporating these variables.  As the JCT observed (2003, 63): 
The IRS reports that the improvements will enable the IRS to increase the level 
of reporting and filing compliance, reduce “no-change” rates, and focus 
available resources on abusive trusts, shelters, and complex tax issues. 
 
The following tables show correlations among these variables measured by the 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient (Table 19) and the Spearman Correlation Coefficient 
(Table 20).  Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients are shown in the below 
table.  Under the Pearson Correlation, a ratio scale is utilized (normality is assumed). 
Table 19  
Pearson Correlations 
    R98 GAP ADT LIT HRS CHG 
R98 Pearson Correlation 1           
  Sig. (2-tailed)             
  N             
GAP Pearson Correlation -0.224 1         
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.330           
  N 21           
ADT Pearson Correlation -0.825 -0.173 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.452         
  N 21 21         
LIT Pearson Correlation -0.690 0.173 0.561 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.453 0.008       
  N 21 21 21       
                                                                                                                                  Table Continued
                                                                                                                                                 
with multi-year service with IRS were potentially highly threatened by this provision due to the possible 
direct loss of capital such as retirement benefits.  
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HRS Pearson Correlation 0.761 -0.515 -0.881 -0.868 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 0.127 0.001 0.001     
  N 10 10 10 10     
CHG Pearson Correlation -0.914 0.621 0.957 0.891 -0.949 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.001 0.000   
  N 10 10 10 10 10   
R98 = 1998 IRS Reform Act, GAP = BEA-AGI Gap, ADT = number of IRS Auditors, LIT = 
IRS successful tax litigation cases, HRS = number of hours spent auditing a return, and CHG = 
number of IRS audited tax returns with changes.  Sig. = significance level, and N = number of 
observations.  Significant P-values are bolded.   
 
 
Only the number of audited returns with a “tax change” variable in this correlation 
table is marginally significant related to the tax gap (P-value less than .06).  The 1998 
IRS Reform Act variable is significantly related to all variables except for the tax gap (P-
values less than .012).  After 1998, there was a significant decrease in the number of 
auditors (P-value of .000), tax litigation cases (P-value of .001), and audited returns with 
changes (P-value of .000). The hours spent auditing a return increased significantly (P-
value of .011).  Overall, apparently, based on the above table, the JCT-identified IRS 
enforcement measures are interrelated and statistically significant to the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act. 
In Table 20, the rank order of the variables is measured by utilizing the Spearman 
Correlation Coefficient.  This coefficient assumes that the distribution is not normal; thus, 
a nonparametric statistic is calculated.  
Table 20 
Spearman Correlations 
    R98 GAP ADT LIT HRS CHG 
R98 Spearman Correlation 1           
  Sig. (2-tailed)             





GAP Spearman Correlation -0.280 1         
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.218           
  N 21 21         
ADT Spearman Correlation -0.681 -0.268 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.241         
  N 21 21         
LIT Spearman Correlation -0.681 0.158 0.366 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.493 0.103       
  N 21 21 21 21     
HRS Spearman Correlation 0.782 -0.709 -0.648 -0.685 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.022 0.043 0.029     
  N 10 10 10 10     
CHG Spearman Correlation -0.853 0.733 0.794 0.721 -0.915 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.019 0.000   
  N 10 10 10 10 10   
Gap = BEA-AGI Gap, ADT = IRS Auditors, LIT = IRS successful tax litigation cases, HRS = 
number of hours spent auditing a return, CHG = number of IRS audited tax returns with 
changes, and R98 = 1998 IRS Reform Act. Rho = Spearman Correlation coefficient, Sig. = 
significance level, and N = number of observations. 
 
Here, under a monotonic relationship, a statistically significant relationship is indicated 
between the tax gap, audit hours (P-value of .022), and number of audits with changes (P-
value of .016).  The statistically significant relationships (P-values of less than .01) 
between the 1998 IRS Reform Act and all of the independent variables holds as well (as 
seen in the prior table).  The two previous correlation tables show that all of the 
dependent variable measures are correlated.   
When the correlations were calculated based on the first difference technique,23 
the audit variable and the BEA-AGI Gap variable are significantly inversely related (P-
value of .063).  This result indicates that more auditors lead to a smaller tax gap; 
conversely, fewer auditors equate to a larger tax gap.  
                                                 
23 When time series data is utilized, there is the potential for serial correlation data (residuals are correlated 
with their lag values) and the first difference technique can control for this.   
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Multivariate models were analyzed utilizing the above data sets.24   When the 
above model is run without the audit hours and audit change variables, the data set goes 
back to 1981.  This expanded data set in terms of years means that only 3 of the model’s 
20 degrees of freedom are used by the regression, and thus, the model has appreciably 
more data to calculate coefficients and significance levels.  The resulting model is shown 
in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Modeling 1981 to 2001 




Std. Error of 
the Estimate F-statistic P-Value 
Durbin-
Watson 
0.450 0.353 0.008057 4.638915 0.015142 1.932
 
Coefficients 




Beta t-statistic P-Values 
(Constant) .2394283829 .0366807379   6.527360 0.000005
ADT -.0000068723 .0000019555 -1.117557 -3.514268 0.002660
LIT .0000006568 .0000083293 0.019592 0.078859 0.938066
R98 -.0281729901 .0090512055 -1.131659 -3.112623 0.006331
This table regressed all variables with data back to 1981 on the BEA-GAP.  The audit personnel 
(ADT) and 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98) variables are significantly related to the tax gap.  
Predictors: (Constant), audit personnel, successful IRS tax litigation, and the 1998 IRS Reform 
Act.  The dependent variable is the BEA-GAP proxy. 
 
A robust model is indicated in the above table (Table 21).25  The Adjusted R-Square 
indicates that 35 percent of the variation in the model is being explained, and the F-
Statistic is highly significant (P-value of .015).   The Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic 
                                                 
24 Multivariate regression was run using the full data set.  A limitation of this model is that two of the five 
independent variables (audit hours and audited tax returns with changes) only go back to 1992. Thus the 
regression uses 5 of the 9 degrees of freedom.  Neither the model F-statistic nor the t-statistic achieves 
significance, most likely due to the low number of observations.  However, this model with all variables 
had an adjusted R-square (.29), which indicates the model has some predictive value.  
25 A lag effect was modeled by regressing the prior year’s BEA-AGI gap by the then current year’s audits, 
litigation cases, and the 1998 IRS Reform Act variables. The model results remain highly constant; both the 
audit personnel and the 1998 IRS Reform Act variables remain statistically significant and negative (P-
Values of .004 and .020 respectively). 
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(1.932) indicates that serial correlation is not present.  A DW of 2.0 implies no serial 
correlation. 
Both AUDIT and the 1998 IRS Reform Act coefficients (P-values of less than 
.01) indicate that the 1998 IRS Reform Act had an effect on tax compliance.  The above 
model strongly indicates that the decrease in tax auditors resulted in an increase in the 
predicted tax gap.  In other words, more tax auditors lead to a smaller adjusted gross 
income gap. 
Conversely, the negative and significant coefficient for the 1998 IRS Reform Act 
coefficient (P-value of .006) indicates a smaller adjusted gross income gap after 1998.26  
This result implies that a possible effect of the comprehensive changes on tax 
administration is that tax compliance has been affected positively.  Some in Congress 
argued that a fairer IRS would lead to greater voluntary compliance.  The JCT, in its 
review of Congressional intent in passing the 1998 IRS Reform Act, stated that (JCT 
1998, 35): 
Public confidence in the IRS must be restored so that our system of voluntary 
compliance will not be compromised. The Congress believed that most 
Americans are willing to pay their fair share of taxes, and that public confidence 
in the IRS is key to maintaining that willingness. 
 
The two indicator variables for tax complexity/changes (1986 and 1990 Tax Acts) 
were next incorporated into the model.  The resulting model is shown in Table 22.  The 
model’s F-statistic remains significant, and the adjusted R-square explains over 31 
percent of the variation in the model.  Both the AUDIT and the 1998 IRS Reform Act 
coefficients remain negative and significant (P-values of less than .04).  Serial correlation 
                                                 
26 Running the model by altering the year (1997 or 1998) of the 1998 IRS Reform Act Variable did not 
significantly change the model. 
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is once again not indicated.  The model has a DW statistic of 1.92 where a DW of 2.0 
indicates no serial correlation. 
Table 22 
Modeling 1981 to 2001  




Std. Error of 
the Estimate F-statistic P-Value 
Durbin-
Watson 




  Coefficients Error Beta t-statistic P-Values 
(Constant) .2311547010 .0464125281   4.980438 0.000164
ADT -.0000057620 .0000024279 -0.937000 -2.373271 0.031422
LIT -.0000058822 .0000145329 -0.175451 -0.404752 0.691373
A86 -.0039530154 .0069969768 -0.172227 -0.564960 0.580453
A90 -.0026444046 .0083578579 -0.133865 -0.316397 0.756061
R98 -.0252528234 .0110769049 -1.014361 -2.279773 0.037667
This table regressed variables with data back to 1981 on the BEA-GAP.  The audit personnel 
(ADT) and 1998 IRS Reform Act (R98) variables are significantly related to the tax gap. The 
two tax complexity/changes variables 1986 Tax Act (A86) and 1990 Tax Act (A90) are not 
significant. Predictors: (Constant), audit personnel, successful IRS tax litigation (LIT), 1986 Tax 
Act, 1990 Tax Act and the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  The dependent variable is the BEA-GAP 
proxy. 
 
Overall, the above modeling indicates the 1998 IRS Reform Act likely had a 
positive effect on tax compliance initially.  The 1998 IRS Reform Act indicator variable 
is both negative and highly statistically significant (P-value less than .01).  This 
coefficient indicates that after the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the AGI reporting gap declined.  
In other words, there was better overall tax compliance after 1998.  With more outer year 
data, these interesting results can be corroborated.  This result is directly opposite of what 
would be expected based on current Congressional and IRS statements of what is 
perceived as erosion in tax compliance.  However, the statistically significant negative 
relation of the audit variable (P-value of less than .01) to the tax gap indicates a strong 
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correlation between direct audit enforcement and adherence to correct income reporting 
to the IRS.  These relationships imply that Congressional and IRS concerns are justified; 
however, the catalyst is not the 1998 IRS Reform Act but the decline in tax auditors.  As 
reflected in Figure 13 the number of IRS audit personnel dropped from approximately 
20,000 in the late 1980s to 17,000 in 1997 and to 13,500 in 2001. 
5.2.1 Taxpayer Compliance in the Context of NPM 
 Under a traditional management orientation to government operations, key 
attributes are economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  A rational (cost-benefit) approach 
is taken to budgeting in this traditional bureaucratic structure.  The inverse relationship 
between auditors and the tax reporting gap indicates, from a compliance perspective, that 
one cost of the IRS’s adopting an NPM methodology was a decrease in the economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of tax enforcement.  Importantly, Congress all but formally 
mandated this reallocation of resources by requiring the IRS to reorganize and focus on 
taxpayer service (specifically mandated in the first two sections of the 1998 IRS Reform 
Act) and Congress did not provide additional resources in terms of personnel.  The IRS 
simply switched resources from enforcement to service.  As Bergin and Brown (2003) 
observed, the IRS got the message.   
 The initial results of the 1998 IRS Reform Act resulting in better compliance are 
tentative and need to be verified with more data in subsequent years.  If this result holds, 
it would indicate that a key NPM tenet of treating individuals as customers instead of 
impersonal actors resulted in a “better functioning government.”  As Bagby and Franke 
(2001) observed, this is a central outcome measure of whether an NPM orientation is 
successful.  
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5.3 IRS’s Personnel Environment 
The third goal of the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to provide “IRS employees with a 
quality work environment” and was called for in “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities” of 
the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  The third hypothesis predicts that there is no change in the 
IRS’s work environment from this legislative change.  This hypothesis is tested by 
analyzing data the IRS provided for the JCT’s 2003 data request relative to salaries for 
critical pay positions  (§1201) and IRS-mandated employee termination (§1203).   
5.3.1 §1201Critical Pay Authority 
In general, the salary provision is in keeping with NPM’s private market focus (other 
than it had an upper cap).  The U.S. Treasury Secretary was delegated broad authority to 
institute a program to match private sector pay, but with a salary limitation of $175,400.  
The JCT (1998, 46) observed: 
The Act provides OMB with authority to set the pay for certain critical pay 
positions requested by the Secretary under section 5377 of title 5 of the United 
States Code at levels higher than authorized under prior law. These critical pay 
positions are critical, technical, administrative and professional positions other 
than those designated under the streamlined authority. Under the Act, OMB is 
authorized to approve requests for critical position pay up to the rate of pay of 
the Vice President (currently, $175,400). 
 
Congress granted this critical pay authority with the intention of bringing in private 
sector talent that the IRS was lacking.  The JCT observed (1998, 47): 
The Congress believed that as part of restructuring the IRS, the Commissioner 
should have the ability to bring in experts and the flexibility to revitalize the 
current IRS workforce. The current hiring practices often inhibit the ability of 
the Commissioner to change the IRS’ institutional culture. Commissioner 
Rossotti has indicated that, in order to maximize efforts to transform the IRS 
into an efficient, modern and responsive agency, the ability to recruit and retain 
a top-notch leadership and technical team is critical.  
 
The Congress believed the IRS needs the flexibility to recruit employees from 
the private sector, to redesign its salary and incentive structures to reward 
employees who meet their objectives, and to hold non-performers accountable. 
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Personnel and pay flexibilities are necessary prerequisites for larger fundamental 
changes in the IRS. 
 
The majority of these created positions are paid near this cap (when their bonus is 
considered).  The following figure shows the comparisons between the IRS executives’ 
salaries and their prior private sector pay (actual salaries paid to individual IRS 
executives are shown in Appendix VI).   
Figure 17 











The above figure is from salary data provided by the IRS for the JCT’s 2003 (132) data request. 
The IRS reported individual executive salaries and even specifically identified individuals and 
their salaries (prior to IRS employment and their IRS salary).  See Appendix VI for data in table 
form. 
 
Figure 17 and Table 23 convey the reality that private sector pay, in general, was not 
matched in most cases.  However, the Treasury Secretary did provide the salaries nearly 
up to the established ceiling in almost all situations (as indicated by a nearly parallel line 
around $200,000).  The descriptive statistics and statistical comparison of the IRS 
executives’ prior salaries to their IRS salaries are shown in Table 23 (Panel A and B).  
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Table 23 








Mean $248,092 $174,978 -$73,114 -29.47%
Standard Deviation 185,300.80 19,064.95 166,235.85   
Median $197,000.00 $181,400.00 -$15,600.00 -7.92%
Sample Variance 34,336,387,794 363,472,194 33,972,915,913   
Kurtosis 5.0418 -0.4734    
Skewness 2.0917 -0.9251    
Range $934,600 $62,600 $872,000 -93.30%
Minimum $65,400 $130,000 -$64,600 98.78%
Maximum $1,000,000 $192,600 -$807,400 80.47%
Sum $12,156,523 $8,573,900 -$3,582,623 -29.47%
Count 49 49   
This table shows a descriptive comparison of IRS employees’ compensation immediately prior 
to employment at the IRS (Prior Salary) and their compensation at the IRS (IRS Salary). For the 
specific individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix VI. 
 




Pearson Correlation 0.525424445 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
Degrees of Freedom 48 
t – Statistic 2.91 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0028 
t Critical one-tail 1.68 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0055 
t -Critical two-tail 2.01 
 
This table statistically compares the salaries of IRS critical pay employees’ salaries (IRS Salary) 
to what they received immediately prior to working for the IRS (Prior Salary). For the specific 
individual and their salary comparison, see Appendix VI. 
 
On average, IRS Employees received $73,114 (29 percent) less than their private 
sector pay, on a median basis of $15,600 (8 percent less).  In aggregate, those employed 
in the critical pay positions received $12.2 million in private sector pay, but the IRS paid 
them only $8.6 million.  A t-test of the sample means reveals that the pay disparity is 
statistically significant at a P-value of less than .01 (two tailed). 
 78
Despite the greater pay authority provided in the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the IRS 
was still prevented from matching private sector salaries.  A ceiling of $175,400 was 
placed on the salaries and the IRS was actually paid $174,978 (some salaries exceed this 
limitation through bonus awards).27  In the private sector, these positions paid an average 
of $248,092.  This disparity is not surprising considering the high dollar stakes involved 
in matters of taxation.28   
There are clearly outliers in the data for IRS executives’ private sector pay.  
However, excluding the six executives with salaries of $500,000 or more does not change 
the overall implications of the results.   Excluding these data points, the IRS still under-
paid the private sector by over $1.2 million (15 percent less). The average pay was 
$28,000 (15 percent) less and the median pay was $21,000 (11 percent) less.   These 
salary differences are reflected in Tables 24 (Panels A and B). This difference is 
statistically significant at a P-value of less than 1.5 percent (two-tail).  
Table 24 
Panel A: IRS Executive Salaries - Descriptive Statistics  








Mean $190,160 $161,928 ($28,232) -14.85%
Standard Deviation $87,323 $22,665 ($64,658) 
Median $186,000 $165,000 ($21,000) -11.30%
Sample Variance $7,625,372,991 $513,715,393 ($7,111,657,598)   
Kurtosis $1 -$1     
Skewness $1 $0     
      Table Continued 
                                                 
27 “Performance awards for senior executives” were included in the data analysis.  The 1998 IRS Reform 
Act provided for these bonuses. 
28 As noted in footnote 5, Myron S. Scholes (Nobel Prize winner in Economics and co-author of the 




Range $397,600 $67,600 ($330,000)   
Minimum $65,400 $125,000 $59,600  91.13%
Maximum $463,000 $192,600 ($270,400) -58.40%
Sum $8,176,862 $6,962,900 ($1,213,962) -14.85%
Count 43 43     
This table shows a descriptive comparison of IRS employees’ compensation immediately prior 
to employment at the IRS (Prior Salary) and their compensation at the IRS (IRS Salary) 
excluding the six highest paid employees (prior IRS salary). The data was provided as part of the 
2003 JCT data request.  (For the specific individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix 
VI.) 
 
Panel B: T-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 





Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
Degrees of Freedom 42.0000
t – Statistic 2.5711
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0069
t Critical one-tail 1.6820
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0138
t Critical two-tail 2.0181
This table statistically compares the salaries of IRS critical pay employees’ salaries (IRS Salary) 
to what they received immediately prior to working for the IRS (Prior Salary). For the specific 
individuals and their salary comparisons, see Appendix VI. 
 
 
Based on the prior salary analysis, the IRS is still lacking in its ability to match 
private sector pay in critical executive positions.  One could argue that high-level 
executives within the U.S. government can be motivated by factors other than 
compensation (i.e., a human relations orientation versus a scientific management 
approach).  For example, one may be inspired to promote public good or one may be 
motivated by the greater job security that is often present in the governmental sector.  
However, this potential factor is controlled for, in part, by excluding the highest salaries.  
The remaining executives are likely to be highly motivated by the remaining salary 
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differential of nearly $30,000 when they have an average IRS salary of $161,928.  Likely 
offsetting the public good component for some of these employees is their ability to 
benefit from their high-level IRS positions upon re-entering the private sector.  The JCT 
observed (2003, 48): 
From the passage of the IRS Reform Act in July 1998 through March 31, 2003, 
the IRS has hired 49 Streamlined Critical Pay executives, 32 of which currently 
are working for the IRS. Through March 31, 2003, 17 Streamlined Critical Pay 
executives have left the IRS. Average tenure of the executives who have left is 
21 months, with some staying as few as five months and others as long as 42 
months. 
 
Currently, these critical pay positions have an attrition rate of 35 percent.  If pay parity 
were actually achieved, it is highly conceivable that a lower turnover rate would occur; at 
the least, there would be less of a compensation motivation. 
5.3.2 §1203 IRS Employee Termination  
Under “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities,” the IRS was directed to terminate 
employees who violated provisions that were viewed by Congress as grievous.  The JCT 
observed (1998, 50): 
The Act requires the IRS to terminate an employee for certain proven violations 
committed by the employee in connection with the performance of official 
duties.  
 
Of the 3,970 potential §1203 violations, nearly 40% were deemed to have some degree of 
merit.  There were 490 substantiated violations (12 percent) and 1,034 serious 
misconduct violations, but not to the level of §1203 violations (26 percent).   Nearly 60 
percent were deemed not to be substantiated.  These numbers are reflected in Table 25, 




















Seizure Without Approval  1 2 13 16
False Statement Under Oath 1 3 17 21
Constitutional & Civil Rights issues 1 14 265 280
Falsifying or Destroying Documents 10 22 36 68
Assault or Battery 1 6 5 12
Retaliate or Harass 6 126 1,633 1,765
Misuse of §6103 0 0 3 3
Failure to File a Federal Tax Return 386 362 250 998
Understatement of Federal Tax 
Liability 71 476 175 722
Threat to Audit for Personal Gain 13 23 49 85
Totals 490 1,034 2,446 3,970
  12.34% 26.05% 61.61%
This table reflects potential §1203 violations and is a modification of an IRS table provided as a 
result of 2003 JCT (156) data request. The IRS strategically focused attention on the fact that 
only 490 actual §1203 violations occurred.  This overlooks the other 1,034 violations that 
resulted in considerable administrative action (in most cases). 
 
The IRS actually titled the above columns §1203 misconduct, §1203 non-misconduct (re-
titled above as other misconduct) and not-substantiated.  This labeling was strategic in 
that §1203 non-misconduct still involved instances of substantial transgressions.    
A total of 203 employees were removed or left (resigned /retired) because of these 
serious §1203 violations.  In over 45 percent of the cases, the penalty resulted in IRS 
employees no longer working for the IRS.  The violations and the resolutions are reported 
in Table 26.  Tables 25 and 26 reflect that the majority of cases involved some type of 








Substantiated §1203 Violations 











Review Total % 
Seizure 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.2% 
False Statement 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2% 
Constitutional & Civil  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.2% 
Falsifying or Destroying 3 5 1 0 0 1 10 2.0% 
Assault or Battery 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2% 
Retaliate or Harass 1 4 0 1 0 0 6 1.2% 
Misuse of 6103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 
Failure to File 60 92 13 15 175 31 386 78.8% 
Understatement of Tax 11 16 1 1 18 24 71 14.5% 
Threat to Audit  5 4 2 1 1 0 13 2.7% 
Totals 81 122 17 19 194 57 490  
% 16.53% 24.90% 3.47% 3.88% 39.59% 11.63%   
Of 490 substantiated §1203 violations cases, over 40 resulted in IRS employees’ removal from service (one 
way or another). This table is a modification of an IRS table provided as a result of a 2003 JCT (157) data 
request.   
 
Table 26 does not reflect the total universe of potential §1203 violations because a 
separate table reported claims that were deemed, after investigation, not to reach the level 
of §1203 violations, but which, in most cases, resulted in serious administrative action 
(including terminations).  In Table 27, these violations (although not technically §1203 
violations) are listed in order of severity of the resolution disposition: 
Table 27 
Disposition of Violations  
(Not technically §1203 Misconduct)  
  §1203 Violations Total % Cumulative 
Removals 15 1.45% 1.45% 
Separation 25 2.42% 3.87% 
Suspension 55 5.32% 9.19% 
Reprimand 116 11.22% 20.41% 
Counseling Written 339 32.79% 53.19% 
Counseling Oral 62 6.00% 59.19% 




Administrative 162 15.67% 74.85% 
Retired 80 7.74% 82.59% 
Other 180 17.41% 100.00% 
Total 1,034 100.00%  
 
 
The IRS contends that §1203 violation costs (employee morale, employee enforcement 
aggressiveness and management implementation) are not worth the cost for only 409 violations; 
however, this IRS portrayal severely understates the true number. An additional 1,034 
employees received disciplinary action within the context of this code section. This table is a 
modification of an IRS table provided as a result of a 2003 JCT (158) data request.   
 
 
Table 26 shows that in addition to the censure of 409 employees under §1203 violations, 
another 1,000 plus received some form of disciplinary action (ranging from removal to 
oral counseling). 
 Congressional passage of §1203 was a clear product of Congressional hearings 
that highlighted IRS auditors aggressively pursuing taxpayers (particularly non-filers) 
when IRS employees themselves were not filing.  Adding substantial weight to this 
authority, the 1998 IRS Reform Act clearly states that only the IRS Commissioner can 
mitigate termination under this section, and his decision is non-delegable.   
The IRS in 2003 highlighted that only 409 employees have actually been fully 
censured under §1203 and strongly implied that certain parts of this section have costs 
that clearly outweigh the benefits.  The IRS stated in a JCT data request (2003, 147): 
 
The overall objective of §1203 was to ensure that employees who commit 
serious misconduct are removed from Federal employment. The discretion of 
IRS managers was limited, as was the employee’s ability to have a third party 
review the penalty determination. The §1203 penalties have been applied most 
frequently in cases involving employee tax compliance— fewer than 7% of the 
substantiated allegations involve the other eight §1203 provisions. … Seventy-
five percent of the tax compliance cases result in mitigation of penalty … The 
effectiveness of the law is compromised by overly broad language in the law 
that encompasses these cases. 
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The IRS in its 2003 budget request sought to have revisions made to the filing section 
violations (among other §1203 changes).   The JCT stated (2003, 48), “According to the 
IRS, such changes are necessary because §1203 is negatively affecting employee morale 
and effectiveness.”  These sub-sections call for employee termination, and they 
specifically read (1998 IRS Reform Act, §1203): 
 (8) Willful failure to file any return of tax required under the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 on or before the date prescribed therefore (including any 
extensions), unless such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful 
neglect;  
 
(9) Willful understatement of Federal tax liability, unless such understatement is 
due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect;  
 
Ironically, as the IRS was seeking to modify these sections, over 800 of its employees 
were identified as potentially taking inappropriate Schedule C deductions.  This scam 
came to light in an initial review of 25 returns in which a systematic pattern of 
inappropriate deductions was identified.   
Evidently the IRS is backing off its request for modifications of §1203 as its 
January 2, 2004 new release is titled, “IRS Strengthens Employee Tax Compliance 
Program.”  The release observed that the 1998 IRS Reform Act requires termination of 
employees who misreport or do not file a return.  A direct quote from IRS Commissioner 
Mark Everson indicates a change in position, and it states (IRS 2004, 1): 
I am disappointed that a small but unacceptable number of our employees have 
generated false business deductions to reduce their taxes. We have a zero 
tolerance standard for abuse of the tax laws by employees. As administrators of 
the tax system, our employees must maintain the absolute highest standards 
when it comes to their own taxes. 
 
Paradoxically, the original Congressional intent of §1203 now appears to be the IRS 
company line.  Americans do indeed deserve and expect IRS employees to have the 
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“highest standards when it comes to their own taxes,” not a scaled down version, as the 
IRS was seeking in 2003. 
IRS Personnel Environment Results in the Context of NPM 
 Adoption of a new NPM requires an agency organizational structure to become 
more competitive and business-like.  In other words, a private market focus is to be 
incorporated in the organization.  When Congress passed the 1998 IRS Reform Act, it 
specifically recognized this issue relative to top IRS management compensation, and thus 
gave the U.S. Treasury Secretary broad authority in setting compensation levels for 
senior level management.  Unfortunately, it also arbitrarily capped compensation to no 
more than the U.S. Vice President’s compensation.  This restriction means that IRS 
senior level management is underpaid by 15 percent as compared to the private sector.  
This compensation deficiency no doubt adds to retention problems for the IRS.  For 
example, senior IRS management hired under this initiative have a 35 percent attrition 
rate.  The cost of this failure to match private sector compensation has a meaningful 
impact on IRS administration.  For example, the IRS’s core taxpayer computer files (over 
175 million in 2003) are still maintained on a “1960 magnetic tape based system” and the 
IRS contends that its inability to hire and/or retain high level information technology 
managers is a primary cause of its inability to upgrade its core computer system.    
 The 1998 IRS Reform Act sought to increase the IRS’s responsiveness to 
taxpayers, in part, by requiring IRS employee termination when grievous treatment of 
taxpayers by an IRS employee occurred.  In 2003, the IRS portrayed this employee 
termination provision as problematic and indicated that it resulted in little direct action 
but consumed an enormous amount of management resources.  However, analysis of the 
IRS supplied data showed that this provision did have a greater effect both directly and 
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indirectly than the IRS portrayed.  In 2004, the IRS reversed course on this provision 
when an IRS filing scandal was uncovered and the IRS observed the importance of this 
provision.  NPM dictates that agency constituents see a responsive agency that treats 
individuals fairly.  An analysis of “Subtitle C-Personnel Flexibilities” indicates that the 
provision that requires high standards for all IRS employees has affected IRS personnel 
decisions more than the IRS portrayed to Congress in 2003. 
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CHAPTER 6. COMPREHENSIVE IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Through multiple research methodologies, the effects of the 1998 IRS Reform Act 
were assessed.  Congressional intent was crystal clear in the passage of this legislation, in 
that the first two sections of the Act were titled, “Sec. 1001. Reorganization of the 
Internal Revenue Service” and the second section was titled, “Sec. 1002. Internal 
Revenue Service Mission to Focus on Taxpayers’ Needs.”  Thus, the IRS was faced with 
a Congressional mandate that it adopt a NPM methodology, specifically the core values 
of “responsiveness to customers” and treating taxpayers as “customers” (Rosenbloom and 
Kravchuk 2002, 39). 
Six years after the overwhelming passage of this Act, a full and comprehensive 
assessment of this landmark legislation is necessary.  This dissertation has focused on the 
three strategic goals (service, enforcement, and the IRS’s personnel environment) that the 
IRS adopted to implement the sweeping Congressional mandate for fundamental reform. 
This dissertation is flowcharted from the commencement to the conclusion in Figure 18.  
The three strategic goals of the IRS were directly implemented by the IRS with 
the radical adoption of an NPM methodology to the administration of the tax code.  The 
IRS from 1952 to 1998 utilized a traditional management approach to tax administration.  
The IRS (2000)29 observed: 
In the late 1990s, however, the IRS was the subject of intense scrutiny and 
criticism. A Presidential commission, Congress, and the Vice President's 
National Partnership for Reinventing Government looked closely into the way 
the IRS did its work. The overall finding was that the IRS was expected to do a 
far better job in serving the public, based on a much better understanding of the 
taxpayers' point of view. 
                                                 
29 This cite is from the cover page on the IRS web site on Modernizing America’s Tax Agency, 
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Key Congressional intent for better taxpayer service has not been achieved to 
date.  Compliance and IRS Employee provisions had mixed results. 
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As observed in the NPM section of this dissertation, former Vice President Al Gore’s 
National Partnership for Reinventing Government was “the Clinton administration’s 
manifestation of the NPM approach.”  The implications of tax policy changes made under 
the framework of NPM can now be assessed. 
 Partial replication of the 1990 IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey clearly indicates that 
taxpayers did not perceive they were receiving top quality service, as specifically called 
for in the IRS mission statement (radically transformed in 1998 to focus on service).  In 
fact, the IRS received a universal decrease in the highest ratings categories and 
significantly decreased scores in two of the six categories mean scores that specifically 
evaluated the IRS’s implementation of NPM methodology.  Thus, the IRS’s 
implementation of NPM is perceived as unsuccessful by those taxpayers surveyed 
(especially since the IRS established “top quality service” as its first strategic goal in 
response to the 1998 IRS Reform Act)  
Interestingly, taxpayers rated the overall taxation system better in 2004 than in 
1990.  Taxpayers’ perceptions of unrealistically high audit rates approaching 20 percent 
were recorded in both the 2004 and 1990 surveys.  There appear to be different 
perceptions of the IRS based on the tax forms that survey respondents filed, and this 
indicated result would be an interesting avenue for further research.  Overall, the results 
strongly indicate that the IRS is not perceived by the taxpayers to have successfully 
instituted NPM. 
 Taxpayer compliance was modeled utilizing the Bureau of Economic Advisors 
estimates of the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap.  This income estimate was then 
compared to the AGI taxpayers actually report to the IRS.  A varying gap of 
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approximately 11 percent was present from 1998 to 2001. There were significant 
correlations among the enforcement variables studied (audit personnel, tax litigation, 
audit hours and audit changes) and the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  In subsequent multivariate 
modeling, both the audit variable (ADT) and the IRS Reform Act (R98) were 
significantly related to the income reporting gap.  The audit variable (ADT) was 
negatively related to the tax gap indicating that fewer auditors lead to a greater reporting 
gap. 
 The opposite and interesting result was seen in the 1998 IRS Reform Act variable 
(R98).  The 1998 IRS Reform Act was negatively related to the tax gap, indicating that 
the 1998 IRS Reform Act is related to a decrease in the tax gap.  One implication is that 
Congressional concern over having a responsive IRS was justified, and the overall effect 
of the 1998 IRS Reform Act is better voluntary tax compliance on the part of taxpayers 
(not withstanding the survey results).  This result is interesting, in that taxpayers rated the 
overall tax system as fairer in the 2004 survey. With additional data points (which will 
become available in subsequent years), this result can be better measured and assessed.  If 
this result holds, on the central NPM tenet of treating individuals as customers instead of 
impersonal actors has resulted in a “better functioning government” (Bagby and Franke).  
 IRS senior executives do not have pay parity with the private sector.  A 
significant and practical difference in compensation remains, despite the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act specifically granting critical pay authority under §1201 to the Secretary of 
the Treasury.  However, the Secretary of the Treasury utilized the provision to the full 
extent.  Congress capped compensation levels so that they did not exceed the Vice 
President of the United States’ salary.  The IRS, with a 1960’s information based 
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technology infrastructure, would seem in desperate need of private sector talent.  
Executives receiving the enhanced compensation still had a nearly 30 percent turnover 
rate.  The failure to achieve compensation parity prevents full implementation of NPM 
(competitive market focus).  
 The 1998 IRS Reform Act directly resulted from Congressional hearings led by 
the late Senator William Roth, Jr.  The IRS was heavily criticized because auditors 
forcefully went after non-filers when some IRS employees themselves were not filing tax 
returns.  This paradoxical situation directly resulted in Congress enacting §1203.  This 
section listed violations that IRS employees would be terminated for, barring direct 
intervention by the Commissioner of the IRS (at his or her “sole discretion”). 
In 2003, the IRS portrayed the effect of part of this termination section as causing 
more problems than it was worth.  However, assessing the IRS’s supporting data reveals 
that many violations that did not reach the §1203 threshold were nevertheless of a serious 
magnitude (the IRS downplayed this reality).  Interestingly, the IRS has apparently 
reversed course on modifying §1203 (after revelations of an IRS employees’ filing 
scandal).  As of 2004, the IRS appears to have come full circle back to the ideals of the 
1998 IRS Reform Act that demanded that IRS employees have the highest reporting 
standards.  Based on IRS supplied data, it is apparent that §1203 has been utilized to 
address employee misconduct more than the IRS portrayed in 2003.  A central tenet for 
NPM is for an agency to treat individuals fairly and §1203 appears to accomplish this. 
Overall, integrating these results shows that the 1998 IRS Reform Act has failed 
to improve taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS.  Taxpayer compliance, as measured by the 
BEA-AGI gap, appears to have improved since 1998, but the number of auditors has 
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materially declined.  The IRS’s personnel environment is still not at the level where 
Congress wanted.  In summation, the IRS implementation of NPM has had mixed results, 
however on the central IRS’s goal of providing “top quality service” the survey results 
strongly indicate that the IRS has been unsuccessful to date. 
6.1 Limitations 
Tax legislation is generally enacted on an annual basis.  Thus, tax policy occurs in 
a highly charged political environment and any tax policy study is subject to this political 
reality.  The present post-1998 IRS Reform Act survey replication is based on the 1990 
IRS Taxpayer Opinion Survey.  The 1998 IRS Reform Act was thus passed eight years 
after the initial survey.  Ideally, the 1990 survey would have been conducted closer to 
1998.  However, if it had been conducted too close in time, the proximity in time would 
have caused problems as well (taxpayers likely would have had a heightened awareness 
of the IRS’s transgressions leading up to the 1998 IRS Reform Act). 
If a survey had been done in 1998, it may have shown higher taxpayer 
dissatisfaction with the IRS than was observed in 1990.  Therefore, taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the IRS could have improved since 1998 and this would not be reflected in 
the 1990/2004 comparison.  Additionally, a further limitation is that the effects of the 
1998 IRS Tax Reform Act may be longer term in nature and thus are not observable at 
this point in time.  However, in the 2004 survey, the IRS received far from “top quality” 
service marks, and, in fact, had a universal decrease in the most favorable categories. 
Taxpayer compliance data lacks complete data streams.  Only four years of data 
after the 1998 IRS Reform Act are currently available.  Additionally, the audit hour 
variable (HRS) and audit change variable (CHG) are only available back to 1992.  The 
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IRS personnel environment hypothesis had only limited data to be tested although the 
results were statistically significant.  The above factors limit the implications for this 
study, as well as most academic studies in tax policy.   By utilizing several research 
methodologies, these limitations are mitigated to a good degree.  
6.2 Contributions 
The IRS, with nearly $2 trillion in annual cash flow, has twice the aggregate 
revenue of the ten largest U.S. Corporations.  Thus, in its own right, the degrees of the 
IRS’s implementation of legislatively mandated changes in tax policy have major 
economic ramifications.  In 2002, the IRS collected $1.8 trillion in total tax revenue.  The 
IRS officially estimated annual non-compliance on a tax revenue basis at a material $250 
to $300 billion (GAO 2002B, 51), approximately 15 percent of total tax revenues.  The 
implications of this “tax slippage” for a tax system built primarily on voluntary 
compliance should not be understated.   
This study adds to the understanding of the implications of instituting tax policy 
changes made under the framework of NPM.  The IRS bureaucracy, prior to the 1998 
IRS Reform Act, was administered within a rigorous impersonal traditional management 
structure.  The 1998 IRS Reform Act legislatively mandated the IRS to adopt an NPM 
orientation in administering the IRC in order to become more responsive to taxpayers 
(service oriented).  Using different methodological approaches, this dissertation 
ascertained the effects on federal tax administration of switching from a traditional 
management approach to an NPM approach.  
Investigating the aggregate effect of the momentous 1998 IRS Reform Act is in 
and of itself a meaningful contribution.  The utilization of a partial replication of the 
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IRS’s 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey allowed for long-term assessments of public 
perceptions on the IRS’s administration.  This dissertation contributes to an 
understanding of the process of taxation within the reality of a long-term political 
environment.  The combination of these analyses with the legislative mandate for the IRS 
to track its progress in achieving the goals set forth in the 1998 IRS Reform Act provided 
for a rich data source.   
The study is exploratory in nature, in that the data contained within the 
Congressional Reviews of the 1998 IRS Reform Act has mostly not been utilized in a tax 
accounting research context.  Incorporating the Bureau of Economic Analysis - Adjusted 
Gross Income (BEA-AGI) Gap (as a measure of the tax-reporting gap) with the JCT-
identified enforcement variables results in a unique data stream combination. The IRS 
often contends that there is no longer an updated long-term measure of tax compliance 
since the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program was terminated in 1988.30  
Often tax research focuses on a particular change in a particular year.  However, 
that approach fails to address the overall dynamics of the taxation process, which is 
subject to a continuously changing environment.  The testing of a governmental policy 
implemented under NPM will potentially affect forthcoming tax reform initiatives and 
allow for the prediction of effects of legislative changes (i.e., positive accounting theory).  
Overall, this research contributed to an examination of U.S. tax policy by centering on a 
unique event.  Moving the tax system towards an NPM methodology was hypothesized to 
have materially affected U.S. tax administration.  This dissertation found statistically 
significant results in all three areas that centered on the IRS’s three strategic goals that 
were established to specifically implement the congressional mandate established in the 
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1998 IRS Reform Act.  Utilization of different methodological approaches resulted in the 
triangulation of data results. 
Passage of the 1998 IRS Reform Act and subsequent changes have not altered 
taxpayers’ opinions within the context of the partial replication of the 1990 Taxpayer 
Opinion Survey.  If taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS had improved, the change should 
have been detected in the 2004 survey.  Analyses of tax compliance after the 1998 IRS 
Reform Act present a mixed picture.  The 1998 IRS Reform Act appears significantly 
related to a decrease in the tax-reporting gap (more outer year data is needed to confirm 
these results).  However, the number of tax auditors is significantly related to the tax gap 
(more auditors are related to better tax compliance).  IRS senior executives do not receive 
private sector pay parity, despite the 1998 IRS Reform Act §1201 specifically addressing 
this problem.  The intent for IRS employees to strictly adhere to filing tax returns, as 
mandated under the 1998 IRS Reform Act §1203, has proven reasonable, despite IRS 
calls in its 2003 budget request for §1203 modifications.  Fortunately this call has 
apparently been rescinded.  
6.3 Contributions from a NPM Perspective 
From an NPM perspective, the IRS’s implementation of this management 
paradigm has produced mixed results.  Concerning the critical aspect of taxpayer service, 
the survey results clearly indicate that those taxpayers surveyed do not perceive that they 
are receiving “top quality service.”  Congress mandated that the IRS adopt a customer 
service focus in the second section of the 1998 IRS Reform Act (§1002 was titled 
“Internal Revenue Service Mission to Focus on Taxpayers Needs”).  The IRS’s first 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 See supra, note 4.  
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strategic goal, after the 1998 IRS Reform Act was to provide “top quality service to each 
taxpayer” (JCT 2003, 1). 
An analysis of the compliance data produced a mixed picture as to the IRS’s 
success in implementing NPM.  After the 1998 IRS Reform Act, initial data indicates 
better tax reporting by taxpayers.  Thus, a “better functioning government” may have 
occurred from a collection perspective.  However, after the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the 
number of IRS tax auditors declined further and associated key enforcement measures 
continued to decline.  The data indicated that the number of tax auditors is inversely 
related to the tax reporting gap. 
From the IRS’s personnel environment perspective, the IRS continues to lack 
private pay parity.  Under a NPM orientation, an organization should become 
“competitive” and more “firm like.”  The 1998 IRS Reform Act mandated that IRS 
employees face expedited terminations if they infringed on taxpayers’ rights.  From a 
“responsiveness to customers” perspective, this section has had considerably more impact 
than the IRS initially portrayed to Congress in 2003 (the IRS essentially recanted this 
assertion in 2004).   
Overall, the IRS’s implementation of NPM can be considered unsuccessful to a 
great degree.  Taxpayers do not perceive they are receiving “top quality service” and this 
was a fundamental objective of the 1998 IRS Reform Act.  In fact, Congressional 
hearings, which were the catalyst for the 1998 IRS Reform Act, highlighted taxpayer 
abuse by the IRS.  The IRS shifted resources as mandated in this Tax Act, resulting in 





Alexander, D. (undated). An open letter to the new commissioner of Internal Revenue 
from Donald C. Alexander (former IRS commissioner).  
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/readingsintaxpolicy.nsf/0/E9EEA337B5A5DEF685256879005DC57F?OpenDocument, 11/25/03. 
 
Bagby, L. and J. Franke. 2001. Escape from politics: Philosophic foundations of public 
administration.  Management Decisions 39 8: 623-633. 
 
Bergin, C. and S. Brown. 2003. IRS reform: Has it failed? Tax Notes 99 (June 9): 1563-
1566. 
 
Birnbaum, J. 1998. Fundamental tax reform: Public perception and political rhetoric. 
National Tax Journal 52 (1) September: 565-567. 
 
Bonacum, L. and N. Allen. 2002. Just trying to help, says IRS about latest random audit 
program. CCH (June 20). 
 
Bryan-Low, C. 2003. KPMG didn’t register strategy. wsj.com (November 17). 
 
Crumbley, D. L. 1973. Behavioral implications of taxation. The Accounting Review 48 
(October): 759-763.  
 
Denhardt, R. and J. Denhardt. 2000. The new public service: Serving rather than steering. 
Public Administration Review 60 (6) (November/December): 549-559. 
 
Donlan, T. 2003. The tax man passeth. Barrons (May 19): online.  
 
Donmoyer, R. 1998. With last blast of fanfare, Clinton signs IRS reform. Tax Notes 80 
(July 27): 415-419. 
 
Dooren, J. and G. McWilliams. 2003. IRS launches review of delays for massive 
computer upgrade. Wall Street Journal (July 28): online. 
 
Forest, A. and S. Sheffrin. 2002. Complexity and compliance: An empirical investigation. 
National Tax Journal. 55 (1) (March): 75-88. 
 
Frederickson, H. 1996. Comparing the reinventing government movement with the new 
public administration. Public Administration Review 56 (3) (May/June) 263-270. 
 
GAO (General Accounting Office). 2003. IRS Modernization: Continued progress 
necessary for improving service to taxpayers and ensuring compliance.  GAO-03-796T. 
GAO (May 20). 
 




Harmelink, P. and W. VanDenburgh. 2002. The failure of the IRS to provide top quality 
service. Advances in Taxation 14: 137-158. 
 
Harmelink, P., T. Porcano, and W. VanDenburgh. 2003. Tax administration problems: 
GAO-identified shortcomings and implications. Advances in Taxation 15: 43-91. 
 
Hatry, H. 1999. Mini-symposium on intergovernmental comparative performance data. 
Public Administration Review 59 (2) (March/April) 101-104. 
 
Hevrdejs, M. 1998. CCH- explanation: New-law 1998 IRS reform act. CCH (July).   
 
Hite, P. 2002. The preparer effect on IRS customer satisfaction. Advances in Taxation 14: 
159-183. 
 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2000. Modernizing America's tax agency 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98170,00.html, 11/18/03. 
 
IRS (2003). 1040 Instructions. 
 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2004. IRS Strengthens Employee Tax Compliance 
Program, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-001.pdf. IR-2004-1. 1/2/04. 
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 1998. General explanation of tax legislation enacted 
in 1998. JCS-6-98. JCT (November 24). 
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 1999. Report of the joint committee on taxation 
relating to the internal revenue service as required by the IRS reform and restructuring act 
of 1998. JCX-24-99. JCT (May 20). 
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 2000. Report of the joint committee on taxation 
relating to the internal revenue service as required by the IRS reform and restructuring act 
of 1998. JCX-46-00. JCT (April 28).  
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 2001. Report of the joint committee on taxation 
relating to the internal revenue service as required by the IRS reform and restructuring act 
of 1998. JCX-33-01. JCT (May 4). 
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 2002. Report of the joint committee on taxation 
relating to the internal revenue service as required by the IRS reform and restructuring act 
of 1998. JCX-38-02. JCT (May 10). 
 
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). 2003. Report of the joint committee on taxation 
relating to the internal revenue service as required by the IRS reform and restructuring act 
of 1998. JCX-53-03. JCT (May 19). 
 
Johnston, D. 2003.  A tax shelter, deconstructed. nytimes.com. (July 13). 
 99
Ledbetter, M. 2004A. Comparison of BEA estimates of personal income and IRS 
estimates of adjusted gross income.  Survey of Current Business (April): 8-22.  
 
Ledbetter, M. and V. Lee. 2004B. Federal personal income tax liabilities and payments.  
Survey of Current Business (June): 17-20.  
 
Mackie, J. 2002. Unfinished business of the 1986 tax reform act: An effective tax rate 
analysis of current issues in the taxation of capital income. National Tax Journal 55 (2) 
(June): 293-337. 
 
McGuire, T. 1999. Proposition 13 and its offspring: for good or evil.  National Tax 
Journal 52 (1) March: 129-138. 
 
National Tax Journal Symposium. 1998. Panel on IRS restructuring. National Tax 
Journal 51 (3) (September): 415-435. 
 
Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler, 1992. Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial 
spirit is transforming the public sector.  Perseus Press. 
 
Park, T. 2002 Comparison of BEA estimates of personal income and IRS estimates of 
adjusted gross income. Survey of Current Business. (November): 13-20. 
 
Porcano, T. 1984. Distributive justice and tax policy. The Accounting Review 59 (4) 
(October): 619-636.  
 
Poterba, J. 1998. Public finance and public choice. National Tax Journal 51 (2) (June) 
391-396. 
 
Richardson, J. and W. Hildreth.  1998. Handbook of taxation. Marcel Dekker. 22-26.  
 
Rosenbloom, D. and R. Kravchuk. 2002. Public administration understanding 
management, politics, and law in the public sector. McGraw-Hill.  
 
Scholes, M. and M. Wolfson. 1992.  Taxes and Business Strategy, Prentice-Hall. 
 
Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc. 1991. 1990 Taxpayer opinion survey. Internal 
Revenue Service.  
 
Sexton, T., S. Sheffrin. and A. O’Sullivan. 1999. Proposition 13: Unintended effects and 
feasible reforms. National Tax Journal 52 (1) March: 99-111. 
 
Shackelford, D. and T. Shevlin. 2001. Empirical tax research in accounting. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 31: 321-387.    
 
Shevlin, T. 1999. Research in taxation. Accounting Horizons 13 (4) (December): 427-
441.  
 100
Smith, E., Harmelink, P. and J. Hasselback. 2002. 2003 CCH Federal Taxation, 
Comprehensive Topics, CCH-Incorporated. 
 
Tannenwald, R. 2002. Are state and local revenue systems becoming obsolete?  National 
Tax Journal 55 (3) (September): 467-489. 
 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). 2003. Improvements are 
needed to ensure returns are correctly prepared at taxpayer assistance centers. TIGTA-
2004-40-025. TIGTA (December 10). 
 
Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). (2003). TRAC-IRS, National 
Profile and Enforcements Trends over Time. Syracuse University. 
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/v08/index.html (October).  
 
U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Secretary John Snow Testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and Independent 
Agencies. May 20, 2004. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1671.htm on 6/28/04. 
 
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1979. The demand for and supply of accounting theories: 
The market for excuses. The Accounting Review 54 (2): 273-305. 
 
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Prentice-Hall. 14. 
 
Wilson, W. 1887. The study of administration. Political Science Quarterly (June 2): 197-
222. 
 
Wise, L. 2002. Public Management reform: Competing drivers of change. Public 
Administration Review 62 (5) (September/October): 555-567. 
 101








Relevant Reform Provisions 
(From index, many direct quotes) 
I Reorganization of Structure 
& 
Management of the IRS 
 Change in mission 
 IRS Oversight Board & Taxpayer Advocate 
 IRS Commissioner tenure 
 Treasury Office of Inspector General 
 Executive branch influence & IRS personnel 
II Electronic Filing  E-filing of tax & information returns 
 Paperless e-filing 
 Return free tax system by 2007 
 Access to account information 
III Taxpayer Protection & Rights  Burden of proof  
o Fundamental element of prior IRC 
o Judicially, not legislatively 
created 
o Taxpayer needs credible evidence 
 Taxpayers expanded proceedings  
 Innocent spouse, interest & penalties relief 
 Audit rights, examinations, and collections 
 Studies 
IV Congressional Accountability 
for the IRS 
 GAO studies reviews 
 Joint congressional oversight reports 
 Y2K funding 





Technical Corrections (1997), 
etc. 
 Miscellaneous provisions  
 Repeal 18 month holding period 
 Child credit stacking changes, etc. 













   











   
View of 
 Individual 
Impersonal case, rational 
actor 
Customer 
   
Cognitive 
 Approach 
Rational-scientific Theory, observation, 
measurement, 
experimentation 




 market driven 







This table adapted directly from Rosenbloom and Kravchuk (2002, 39).  
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APPENDIX III SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
1. What is your state of residence_________________ 
 
2. Have you already filed a federal income tax return for last year – that is 2003 – or are 
you planning to file an income tax return? 
 
3. Below are a number of statements about the IRS.  Please tell me how much you agree 
























 An IRS employee is just as knowledgeable as any private tax expert. 
 You can be confident that the IRS would never try to take more money from 
me than it should. 
 You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records. 
 When it comes to investigating its own people, the IRS is as thorough as it is 
with everyone else. 
 Employees who work for the IRS display a high degree of honesty and 
integrity. 
 IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that respect the 
rights of taxpayers. 
 
Circle the most appropriate answer 
4. How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 2003 tax 
return – do you feel it is quite fair to most people, or reasonably fair, or somewhat 
unfair, or quite unfair to most people?  
 
5. During the past few years, how often have you completed your tax form yourself, 
instead of getting help from someone else? Would you say you always do them 
yourself, usually do, sometimes do or never do them yourself?  
 
6. An audit is when the IRS asks you to prove your deductions or answer questions 
about your tax return (either in person or through the mail). Out of every 100 
taxpayers at your income level, what percent do you think were audited last year?  
 
7. Which of the following forms did you use the last time you filed?  
a. 1040-EZ (short form)  
b. 1040-A (regular short-form)  
c. 1040  (long form) 
d. 1040 (long form) plus additional forms and/or schedules  
e. Don’t remember 
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GAP % of 
 BEA- AGI 
1981 $2,016 $1,773 $243 12.05% 
1982 $2,099 $1,852 $247 11.77% 
1983 $2,226 $1,943 $283 12.71% 
1984 $2,473 $2,140 $333 13.47% 
1985 $2,632 $2,306 $326 12.39% 
1986 $2,853 $2,482 $371 13.00% 
1987 $3,121 $2,774 $347 11.12% 
1988 $3,412 $3,083 $329 9.64% 
1989 $3,650 $3,256 $394 10.79% 
1990 $3,798 $3,405 $393 10.35% 
1991 $3,857 $3,465 $392 10.16% 
1992 $4,092 $3,629 $463 11.31% 
1993 $4,245 $3,723 $522 12.30% 
1994 $4,474 $3,908 $566 12.65% 
1995 $4,760 $4,189 $571 12.00% 
1996 $5,145 $4,536 $609 11.84% 
1997 $5,578 $4,970 $608 10.90% 
1998 $6,120 $5,416 $704 11.50% 
1999 $6,554 $5,856 $698 10.65% 
2000 $7,125 $6,365 $760 10.67% 
2001 $6,983 $6,171 $812 11.63% 
This Appendix compares the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Adjusted Gross Income (BEA-
AGI), and the Internal Revenue Service Adjusted Gross Income (IRS-AGI) to calculate an AGI-
Gap (a proxy for taxpayer compliance).  In order to avoid inflationary impacts, AGI-Gap is 





APPENDIX V IRS ENFORCEMENT DATA 
 
 
  Audit   Audited 
 Total IRS  Agents &   Returns With 
Year Employees Auditors Prosecution Hours Changes 
1981 85,672 17,216 1,431   
1982 83,835 17,294 1,185   
1983 90,108 17,354 1,060   
1984 95,749 16,864 1,339   
1985 96,705 17,070 1,361   
1986 102,206 16,911 1,547   
1987 114,018 18,049 1,550   
1988 123,198 19,801 1,393   
1989 113,622 19,813 1,190   
1990 116,425 18,529 1,206   
1991 119,213 18,580 1,066   
1992 114,819 18,651 1,015 10.1 632,331 
1993 110,680 18,097 1,011 8.9 662,232 
1994 109,505 17,666 931 8.1 752,293 
1995 114,064 18,601 850 8.4 717,066 
1996 102,082 17,957 847 9.7 668,133 
1997 97,404 16,935 873 9.5 619,931 
1998 97,375 15,815 766 9.8 473,116 
1999 97,526 14,961 722 11.7 329,494 
2000 97,464 14,216 632 14.4 215,298 
2001 100,577 13,510 503 16.0 170,439 
The above Appendix shows the key IRS enforcement variables used for analysis of taxpayer 
compliance.  This data is from JCT reports, the IRS’s Internet statistical section site, and 
University of Syracuse’s TRAC data.   
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APPENDIX VI IRS’S EXECUTIVE SALARIES 
 
Individual Before IRS Total IRS Difference 
Adams, Robert $167,269 $186,300 ($19,031) 
Allen, Maureen 80,000 150,000 ($70,000) 
Ayres, James 203,179 192,600 $10,579  
Berg, Doug 240,975 186,300 $54,675  
Boswell, William 500,000 192,600 $307,400  
Bratton, Delena 92,016 153,000 ($60,984) 
Chesman, Michael 615,300 186,300 $429,000  
Claytor, Paul 197,000 186,300 $10,700  
Dobbins, Tom 149,537 185,100 ($35,563) 
Duder, John 176,000 192,600 ($16,600) 
Dunahoo, Carol 334,000 192,600 $141,400  
Forman, Fred 622,700 192,600 $430,100  
Gaur, Prashant 255,000 190,000 $65,000  
Horsey, Daniel 196,685 180,000 $16,685  
Jakabcin, George 109,201 140,000 ($30,799) 
Jernigan, Cliff 206,847 181,400 $25,447  
Kist, Franklin 591,661 180,000 $411,661  
Leighty, Colleen 154,614 161,000 ($6,386) 
Liuzzi, John 195,000 192,600 $2,400  
Meier, Kurt 207,000 186,300 $20,700  
Olson, Nina 95,000 135,000 ($40,000) 
Porter, William 107,346 180,000 ($72,654) 
Pursley, Mark 135,000 165,500 ($30,500) 
Ratcliffe, Wilbur 342,341 186,300 $156,041  
Shultz, Paul 186,000 181,400 $4,600  
St. Jacques, Michael 65,400 150,000 ($84,600) 
Stricklin, H. James 125,000 165,000 ($40,000) 
This Appendix lists IRS’s executives hired under §1201 critical pay authority.  
Their pay immediately prior to joining the IRS is compared to their IRS salary.  






Individual Before IRS Total IRS Difference 
Terry, Thomas $199,958 $186,300 $13,658  
Toder, Eric 147,000 165,000 ($18,000) 
Tootson, Jack 205,016 192,600 $12,416  
Warren, Margaret 93,333 150,000 ($56,667) 
Wisniewski, Brenda 363,600 192,600 $171,000  
Conklin, Bert 204,750 181,400 $23,350  
Conti, Vincent 160,000 135,000 $25,000  
Cosgrave, Paul 463,000 181,400 $281,600  
Cunninghame, Donna 118,400 147,500 ($29,100) 
Eads, James 355,717 192,600 $163,117  
Kehoe, Joseph 1,000,000 192,600 $807,400  
LaFaver, John 90,000 155,100 ($65,100) 
Langdon, Larry  650,000 192,600 $457,400  
Liberti, Thomas 228,700 181,400 $47,300  
Matthews, Mark 185,000 192,000 ($7,000) 
Mazei, Albert 220,000 160,000 $60,000  
Myers, Shelly 115,529 130,000 ($14,471) 
Oveson, Wilford 85,107 144,800 ($59,693) 
Reece, John 219,811 192,600 $27,211  
Rinaldi, Jim 308,118 186,300 $121,818  
Rosenker, Heather 150,000 165,000 ($15,000) 
Yuckenberg, Timothy 243,413 186,300 $57,113  
Total $12,156,523 $8,573,900 ($3,582,623) 
This Appendix lists IRS’s executives hired under §1201 critical pay authority.  
Their pay immediately prior to joining the IRS is compared to their IRS salary.  
This data was provided by the IRS per a JCT 2003 data (132) request. 
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